EFF:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 03-55894 & 03-56236

METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER STUDIOS INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

GROKSTER LTD., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 03-55901

JERRY LEIBER, individually d.b.a. Jerry Leiber-Music, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

GROKSTER LTD., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case Nos. CV-01-08541-SVW & CV-01-09923-SVW
Honorable Stephen V. Wilson, United States District Court Judge

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF THE COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION AND NETCOALITION

Kevin McGuiness Edward J. Black
Markham Erickson Jason M. Mahler*
MCGUINESS & HOLCH COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS
400 North Capitol Street, N.W. INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
Suite 585 666 Eleventh Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001 Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 783-5300 (202) 783-0070

Counsel for NetCoalition *Counsel of Record

Dated: September 26, 2003

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT OF AMICI

1. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, amicus

Computer & Communications Industry Association ("CCIA") states

that it is a non-profit trade association and as such has no parent

corporation nor any issued stock or partnership shares of any kind. A

complete list of CCIA's members is publicly available at:

2. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, amicus

NetCoalition states that it is a non-profit trade association and as

such has no parent corporation nor any issued stock or partnership

shares of any kind. A complete list of NetCoalition's members is

publicly available at: .

____________________________
Jason M. Mahler
COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION

Dated: September 26, 2003

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ............................................ i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICI ................................................................................. 1

ARGUMENT ................................................................................................ 3

I. The Rules Advocated By Appellants and Their Amici Would
Undermine The Supreme Court's Betamax Decision and Thereby Cause
Irreparable Harm to the Information Technology and Internet Industries
................................................................................................................ 3

II. Appellants and Their Amici Misrepresent This Court's Ruling in
Napster ................................................................................................. 11

A. Appellants Misunderstand the Napster Court's Holdings Concerning
Contributory Infringement .............................................................. 12

B. Appellants Misunderstand the Napster Court's Holdings Concerning
Vicarious Liability. ......................................................................... 15

III. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 17

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ........................................................... 20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) ...................................................................... passim

A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) ..............................................................................15

In re Aimster Copyright Litigation,
334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) ........................................................................5, 6, 15

MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd.,
259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003)..........................................................13, 17

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
464 U.S. 417 (1984) ..................................................................................... passim

STATUTES

17 U.S.C. � 512(i)(2)..................................................................................................9

17 U.S.C. � 1201(c)(3)...............................................................................................9

35 U.S.C. � 271(b) ...................................................................................................15

35 U.S.C. � 271(c)..............................................................................................14, 15

BILLS

S. 2048 (107th Cong.) ................................................................................................8

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Ahrens, Frank, RIAA's Lawsuits Meets Surprised Targets: Single
Mother in Calif., 12 Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,
Washington Post, September 10, 2003, at E1 ......................................................18

iii

Apple Corporation Press Release, iTune Music Store Hits Five
Million Downloads (June 23, 2003).....................................................................18

Chen, C.J. Alice and Aaron Burstein, The Law and Technology of
Digital Rights Management, 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 487 (2003) ........................10

Evangelista, Benny, Download Lawsuit Dismissed; RIAA Drops
Claim That Grandmother Stole Online Music, San Francisco
Chronicle, September 25, 2003, at B1..................................................................18

Felten, Edward W., A Skeptical View of DRM and Fair Use,
Communications of the ACM (April 2003) .........................................................10

Katoh, Masanobu, Intellectual Property and the Internet: A Japanese
Perspective, 2002 U. Ill. J. L. Tech. & Policy 333 (2002).....................................8

Knauss, Tim, Lawsuits Scare Off CNY Music Downloaders, Syracuse
Post Standard, September 14, 2003, at A1 ...........................................................18

INTEREST OF AMICI

The Computer & Communications Industry Association ("CCIA") is

an association of computer, communications, Internet and technology

companies that range from small entrepreneurial firms to some of the largest

members of the industry. CCIA's members include equipment

manufacturers, software developers, providers of electronic commerce,

networking, telecommunications and online services, resellers, systems

integrators, and third-party vendors. Its member companies employ nearly

one million people and generate annual revenues exceeding $200 billion.

CCIA's mission is to further the interests of its members, their customers,

and the industry at large by serving as the leading industry advocate in

promoting open, barrier-free competition in the offering of computer and

communications products and services worldwide.1

NetCoalition serves as the public policy voice for some of the world's

most innovative Internet companies on the key legislative and administrative

proposals affecting the online world. NetCoalition provides creative and

effective solutions to the critical legal and technological issues facing the

Internet. By enabling industry leaders, policymakers, and the public to

1 StreamCast once was a member of CCIA but no longer is.

engage directly, NetCoalition has helped ensure the integrity, usefulness,

and continued expansion of this dynamic new medium.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City

Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) ("Betamax"), and this Court in A & M Records,

Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)("Napster"), created fair

and practical rules for secondary copyright liability. These rules have

unleashed the creative powers of the information technology industry and

led directly to the growth of the Internet. Appellants and their amici now

seek to change these rules, and replace them with new standards that would

as a practical matter give the entertainment industry a veto power over the

development of innovative products and services. Although appellants and

their amici claim that the District Court below misunderstood this Court's

holdings in Napster, it is they who misread Napster. This misreading would

wreck havoc in the information and technology industries, and would harm

users of digital information.

We do not condone the infringement that occurs over the Internet in

general and peer-to peer networks in particular. However, the

misinterpretation of Betamax and Napster is not the proper solution to this

problem. Accordingly, this Court should resist the misreading of Betamax

and Napster urged by appellants and their amici.

All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.

ARGUMENT

I. The Rules Advocated By Appellants and Their Amici Would
Undermine The Supreme Court's Betamax Decision and Thereby
Cause Irreparable Harm to the Information Technology and
Internet Industries.

This case is about more than the legality of peer-to-peer software. It

is about the future of the information technology ("IT") industry, the

Internet, and the fair use of digital works.

The legal foundation upon which the IT industry stands is the

Supreme Court's decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City

Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)("Betamax"). In Betamax, the Supreme Court

proclaimed that the manufacturer of a product could not be held secondarily

liable for infringing uses of the product so long as the product was capable

of substantial noninfringing uses. That clear standard gave venture

capitalists, engineers, and manufacturers the confidence and certainty that

they could invest their resources in developing a wide range of consumer IT

products without facing copyright liability. These products include personal

computers, laptops, scanners, printers, and the software that enables them to

operate.

Prior to the sale of these products, the investors and manufacturers

have known that consumers could use them to infringe the copyrights in

computer programs, computer games, sound recordings, motion pictures,

and many literary works. And once the products have been on the market,

the investors and manufacturers have known for a certainty that some

consumers have in fact used the products for infringing purposes. The

investors and manufacturers likewise have known that government and

business employees have used their workplace computers to make infringing

copies, although perhaps to a lesser degree than their home computers.

Nonetheless, under the Betamax standard, the investors and manufacturers

have also known that they were safe from copyright liability because these

products were all capable of substantial noninfringing uses.

In the nearly twenty years since the Betamax decision, the IT

revolution has created millions of jobs in the U.S. and abroad. It has

increased the productivity of businesses, and dramatically enhanced people's

ability to access and use information. Although digital technology has

exposed the entertainment industry to copyright infringement, it has also

benefited the entertainment industry in numerous ways. Computer graphics

are routinely used in the production of both live action and animated films

and television shows to make special effects look more realistic. Digital

recording technology enables a small number of musicians and technicians

to create the sound of an orchestra. Digital storage media such as compact

discs and digital versatile discs ("DVDs") provide consumers with

previously unimaginable audio and video quality. DVDs have created a

huge new market for the picture industry -- $ 11.7 billion in 2002 alone.2

In their briefs, appellants and their amici contend that the District

Court misapplied this Court's holdings in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,

Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)("Napster"), as well as the Supreme

Court's Betamax decision. But what they really are advocating is for this

Court to significantly limit the applicability of Betamax, and to replace this

Court's holdings in Napster with those of Judge Posner in In re Aimster

MGM Plaintiff-Appellants' Opening Brief at 42 ("MGM Brief"); Brief in

Support of Reversal by Amici Curiae Law Professors and Treatise Authors

at 22-23 ("Boorstyn Brief"); Brief of Amici Curiae of FullAudio Corp. et al.

at 17-18 ("FullAudio Brief"); Brief of Amici Curiae American Film

Marketing Association et al. at 14 ("AFMA Brief").

In Aimster, Judge Posner explicitly disagreed with Napster and

implicitly disagreed with Betamax. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649. Judge Posner

2 Brett Sporich, DVD Boom Continues, Billboard, August 16, 2003, at 42.

read into Betamax a non-existent cost-benefit test, stating that "when a

supplier is offering a product or service that has noninfringing as well as

infringing uses, some estimate of the respective magnitudes of these uses is

necessary for a finding of contributory infringement." Id. Later, Judge

Posner articulated the following rule: "Even when there are noninfringing

uses of an Internet file-sharing service ... if the infringing uses are substantial

then to avoid liability as a contributory infringer the provider of the service

must show that it would have been disproportionately costly for him to

eliminate or at least reduce substantially the infringing uses." Id. at 653.

This rule, if adopted nationwide, could cripple the IT industry.3 In

order to avoid copyright liability, a company that marketed a product would

have to constantly assess: 1) whether the infringing uses were substantial;

and 2) if they were substantial, whether the infringements could be reduced

or eliminated in a manner that would not be disproportionately costly. Judge

Posner did not define how substantial the infringing uses would have to be,

nor how disproportionate the costs of avoiding the infringement. Judge

Posner also did not appreciate how costly and technically difficult it can be

for a provider of technology products or services to monitor their use and

3 Because Judge Posner found that Aimster had not demonstrated any
noninfringing uses, this statement is mere dicta.

determine whether the use infringed copyright. Since virtually all IT

products have some infringing uses, manufacturers and service providers

would operate in a perpetual state of uncertainty and confront unending

litigation as copyright owners and courts second guessed every engineering

decision the manufacturers made.

Equally harmful would be the vicarious liability rule advocated by

appellants and their amici. They contend that the defendants should incur

vicarious liability because the defendants had the right and ability to include

filters that could limit infringement in the new releases of their software, but

elected not to do so. MGM Brief at 58-62; Boorstyn Brief at 27; AFMA

Brief at 31. But if P2P software distributors have a legal duty to use

infringement filters, so too do all other software and hardware firms. This

rule would require Microsoft to redesign Windows to filter out infringing

works and prevent the transmission of infringing material over the Internet.

Hewlett-Packard would be forced to re-engineer its personal computers to

preclude the installation of P2P software. AOL would be required to

reconfigure its email and instant messaging service to inhibit the attachment

of files containing infringing works.

In other words, appellants are recasting vicarious liability as a means

of requiring IT companies to implement digital rights management ("DRM")

systems. They are trying to get this Court to grant what Congress has

already denied.

In March 2002, Senator Ernest Hollings of South Carolina, Chairman

of the Senate Commerce Committee, introduced S. 2048, the Consumer

Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act. The Hollings bill would

have given copyright owners, consumer groups, and the manufacturers of

digital media devices twelve months to reach an agreement on "security

system standards for use in digital media devices...."4 If within those twelve

months the parties reached an agreement, the Federal Communications

Commission ("FCC") would have adopted those standards as a legally

binding regulation. On the other hand, if the parties did not reach

agreement, the FCC would have been required to initiate a rulemaking

proceeding to adopt a standard.

The Hollings bill came under sharp attack from the IT industry, which

questioned the bill's assumptions and substance.5 Additionally, the bill's

requirement that IT companies include DRM systems represented a

departure from the legislative compromise of Title I of the Digital

4 Digital media devices were defined broadly enough to include all
computers and consumer electronic devices such as CD and DVD players.
5 For a more detailed discussion of the Hollings bill, see Masanobu Katoh,
Intellectual Property and the Internet: A Japanese Perspective, 2002 U. Ill.
J. L. Tech. & Policy 333, 342-347 (2002).

Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"). The IT industry had agreed to the

DMCA's prohibition on the manufacture of circumvention devices and

components only because of the inclusion of the "no mandate clause" in 17

U.S.C. � 1201(c)(3): "Nothing in this section shall require that the design of,

or design and selection of parts and components for, a consumer electronics,

telecommunications, or computing product provide for a response to any

particular technological measure...." Notwithstanding this provision, the

Hollings bill would have required all digital media devices to respond to the

security system standards established pursuant to the legislation.

The Hollings bill also departed from the legislative compromise in

Title III of the DMCA. One of the conditions for an Internet service

provider to be eligible for the DMCA's safe harbors was that it

accommodated and did not interfere with standard technical copyright

protection measures that had been developed "pursuant to a broad consensus

of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary multi-

industry standards process." 17 U.S.C. � 512(i)(2)(A). A security system

developed and mandated by the FCC obviously differs from a consensus

standard developed pursuant to a voluntary multi-industry process.

Because of the strong opposition it aroused, the Hollings bill did not

progress beyond the Senate Commerce Committee, and it died with the end

of the 107th Congress. Having failed to convince Congress to reverse its

"no mandate" policy judgment in the DMCA, Appellants now request this

Court to reach essentially the same result by means of expansive application

of the vicarious liability doctrine.

If this Court adopts appellants' position, the entertainment industry

will be empowered to dictate to the IT industry how to design its products.

To avoid endless cycles of copyright litigation, IT companies will have no

choice but to include whatever DRM systems the entertainment industry

demands. These DRM systems could inhibit the functionality of IT products

and impede innovation. Additionally, the DRM systems inevitably will

diminish users' ability to make lawful copies. This is because it is

impossible to design a DRM system that can distinguish between fair uses

and infringing uses.6 Thus, a DRM system that effectively prevents

infringing uses will also prevent some fair uses.

In short, the contributory infringement and vicarious liability

standards advocated by appellants and their amici would fundamentally

change the character of the IT industry in this country. Instead of a highly

6 Edward W. Felten, A Skeptical View of DRM and Fair Use,
Communications of the ACM (April 2003) at 57, 58; C.J. Alice Chen and
Aaron Burstein, The Law and Technology of Digital Rights Management,
18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 487, 491 (2003).

innovative and competitive sector, where new products are rushed to market

in an effort to satisfy consumer demand and capture market-share, the IT

industry will be regulated by copyright lawyers from the entertainment

industry. These lawyers will second guess every engineering decision made

by every IT company, and will insist upon DRM systems that limit the many

lawful uses recognized by Congress and the courts. This result is precisely

what the Supreme Court rejected in Betamax: enlargement of "the scope of

respondents' statutory monopolies to encompass control over an article of

commerce that is not subject to copyright protection." Betamax, 464 U.S. at

421.

II. Appellants and Their Amici Misrepresent This Court's Ruling in
Napster.

Appellants and their amici go to great lengths to reinterpret this

Court's decision in Napster. They need to reinterpret Napster because a

straightforward application of this Court's holdings to the facts found by the

District Court compel the result reached by the District Court. Napster,

however, needs no reinterpretation because this Court got it right the first

time.

A. Appellants Misunderstand the Napster Court's Holdings
Concerning Contributory Infringement.

In the hundreds of pages appellants and their amici devote to Napster,

they conveniently overlook the most important sentence concerning

contributory infringement. This Court stated, "[w]e are compelled to make a

clear distinction between the architecture of the Napster system and

Napster's conduct in relation to the operational capacity of the system."

Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020. This distinction between architecture and

conduct is the key to Napster, to this case, and to contributory infringement

analysis in the digital era.

This Court explained that the architecture of a product or service must

be evaluated in accordance with the Betamax, capable of substantial

noninfringing use, standard. This Court stated that "a computer system

operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely because the

structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material. To

enjoin simply because a computer network allows for infringing use would,

in our opinion, violate Sony and potentially restrict activity unrelated to

infringing use." Id. at 1021 (citations omitted). Thus, if Shawn Fanning had

simply designed the Napster system and left it to others to operate, he would

have incurred no contributory infringement liability because the architecture

was capable of substantial noninfringing uses.

But Fanning did not just design the system, he also operated it � his

company engaged in ongoing conduct with respect to the architecture.

Conduct, as opposed to architecture, is evaluated under the familiar two part

standard that imposes liability on a person who 1) knowingly 2) induces,

causes, or materially aids the infringing conduct of another person. In the

online context, this two part test is met "if a computer system operator learns

of specific infringing material available on his system and fails to purge such

material from the system...." Id.

The District Court recognized the distinction between architecture and

conduct: "here, the critical question is whether Grokster and StreamCast do

anything, aside from distributing software, to actively facilitate � or whether

they could do anything to stop � their users' infringing activity." MGM

Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1039 (C.D. Cal.

2003)("Grokster"). The District Court concluded that unlike Napster, which

operated the site and facilities through which infringing conduct occurred on

an ongoing basis, Grokster and StreamCast did not engage in any conduct

that materially contributed to infringement. They simply supplied the

architecture. If the "Defendant[s] closed their doors and deactivated all the

computers within their control, users of their products could continue

sharing files with little or no interruption." Id. at 1041. The District Court

here found that unlike Napster, Grokster and StreamCast did not maintain

systems from which they could purge infringing material.

Appellants suggest that Grokster and StreamCast did in fact provide

users of their software with a variety of services that maintained the

performance and security of the P2P networks. MGM Brief at 47. For

example, appellants contend that the district court ignored "expert evidence

that Defendants' networks would deteriorate and ultimately likely cease if

Defendants stopped their continuing contributions." Id. at 51. This Court

should review any alleged factual errors by the District Court concerning the

role Grokster or SteamCast played in maintaining the P2P networks under

the appropriate legal standard. If the Court concludes that Grokster or

StreamCast played such a substantial role in the continuing operation of the

networks that they in effect controlled their use, their conduct starts to look

more like Napster's. See also Betamax, 464 U.S. at 437.

Significantly, this Court's architecture/conduct distinction bears a

striking resemblance to contributory infringement under the patent laws.

The Supreme Court derived its Betamax standard from 35 U.S.C. � 271(c),

where a seller or importer of a component of a patented machine, or a

material used in the practice of a patented invention, did not contribute to

infringement if the component or material was "a staple article or

commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use...." But

35 U.S.C. � 271(c) is just part of the equation. Under 35 U.S.C. � 271(b),

the seller of the staple article of commerce could still infringe a patent if he

"actively induces infringement of a patent...."

Thus, the architecture of a product or service is evaluated under the

Betamax test, which derives from Section 271(c) of the Patent Act. But a

person's "conduct in relation to the operational capacity" of that product or

service can still trigger liability if it induces infringement, as under Section

271(b). Examples of inducement would include advertising that the product

could be used to infringe, or providing demonstrations of how to use the

product to infringe. See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 651. (Aimster's tutorial

demonstrating the sharing of copyrighted music "is the invitation to

infringement that the Supreme Court found was missing in Sony.")

B. Appellants Misunderstand the Napster Court's Holdings
Concerning Vicarious Liability.

Appellants argue that Grokster's and StreamCast's technical ability to

include filters in new releases of their software satisfies the "ability to

supervise the infringing activity" requirement for vicarious liability. MGM

Brief at 58-62. As support, appellants cite this court's second Napster

decision, A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir.

2002)("Napster II"). See MGM Brief at 60, 62; Boorstyn Brief at 27. To be

sure, in Napster II this Court found that Napster could be required to

implement a filtering system based on audio fingerprinting technology.

However, this requirement was part of the remedy ordered by the district

court after finding Napster vicariously liable. It had nothing to do with

establishing Napster's liability in the first place.

In its vicarious liability determination in its first Napster decision, this

Court made no mention of filters or Napster reconfiguring its service. To

the contrary, this Court noted that "the boundaries of the premises that

Napster `controls and patrols' are limited." Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023. This

Court went on to state that "Napster's reserved `right and ability' to police is

cabined by the system's current architecture." Id. at 1024 (emphasis

supplied). Thus, this Court held that a firm's theoretical ability to redesign

its product or service to prevent infringement did not create a legal duty to

do so.

The District Court's vicarious liability holding is in complete accord

with Napster. The "current architecture" of FastTrack and Gnutella cabins

Grokster's and StreamCast's ability to control infringing conduct. The

infringement occurs after the software has passed to the end user, when

neither Grokster nor StreamCast have any control over the user. The District

Court correctly held that "[t]he doctrine of vicarious infringement does not

contemplate liability based upon the fact that a product could be made such

that it is less susceptible to unlawful use...." Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at

1045-46.

III. Conclusion

The District Court observed that it was "not blind to the possibility

that Defendants may have intentionally structured their businesses to avoid

secondary liability for copyright infringement, while benefitting financially

from the illicit draw of their wares." Id. at 1046. Nonetheless, it correctly

recognized that in order to provide the plaintiffs with the relief they sought,

it would have "to expand existing copyright law beyond its well drawn

boundaries." Id.

We understand appellants' frustration with P2P networks and with the

Betamax, Napster, and the district court's decisions. However, the

secondary liability rules appellants advocate would cause irreparable injury

to the IT industry, Internet companies, and users. In the long run, these rules

will also harm appellants, who will be denied markets that the IT industry

otherwise would have created for them.

Appellants claim that the District Court's decision leaves them

powerless to combat infringement over P2P networks. Two recent

developments prove the opposite. First, the Recording Industry Association

of America (RIAA) has begun to sue individual file traders engaged in large

scale infringement. While the RIAA may not have selected all its targets

wisely,7 this strategy appears to have caused a decrease in file trading.8

Second, legal downloads of sound recordings are finally available in a low

cost, user-friendly manner. In iTunes' first two months of operation, for

example, users downloaded over five million songs for 99 cents a piece.9

The combination of vigorous enforcement against hard core infringers and

attractive business models for legal downloads should solve appellants'

problems with P2P networks without crippling the IT industry.

7 E.g., Frank Ahrens, RIAA's Lawsuits Meets Surprised Targets: Single
Mother in Calif., 12 Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants, Washington
Post, September 10, 2003, at E1; Benny Evangelista, Download Lawsuit
Dismissed; RIAA Drops Claim That Grandmother Stole Online Music, San
Francisco Chronicle, September 25, 2003, at B1.
8 Tim Knauss, Lawsuits Scare Off CNY Music Downloaders, Syracuse Post
Standard, September 14, 2003, at A1.
9 Press Release, Apple Corporation, iTune Music Store Hits Five Million
Downloads (June 23, 2003).

Accordingly, this Court should reject the reinterpretation of Betamax

and Napster urged by appellants and their amici.

Respectfully submitted,

_____________________________
Kevin McGuiness Edward J. Black
Markham Erickson Jason M. Mahler*
MCGUINESS & HOLCH COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS
400 North Capitol Street, N.W. INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
Suite 585 666 Eleventh Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20001 Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 783-5300 (202) 783-0070

Counsel for NetCoalition *Counsel of Record