========================================================================= ________________ _______________ _______________ /_______________/\ /_______________\ /\______________\ \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\/ ||||||||||||||||| / //////////////// \\\\\________/\ |||||________\ / /////______\ \\\\\\\\\\\\\/____ |||||||||||||| / ///////////// \\\\\___________/\ ||||| / //// \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\/ ||||| \//// ========================================================================= EFFector Online Volume 09 No. 09 July 25, 1996 editors@eff.org A Publication of the Electronic Frontier Foundation ISSN 1062-9424 IN THIS ISSUE: Bernstein Files for Partial Summary Judgment in Crypto Case Internet Society's Strong Encryption Policy Statement NewsNybbles EFF/EFC Toronto Benefit Concert Wrap-up Upcoming Events Quote of the Day What YOU Can Do Administrivia * See http://www.eff.org/Alerts/ or ftp.eff.org, /pub/Alerts/ for more information on current EFF activities and online activism alerts! * ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Subject: Bernstein to File for Partial Summary Judgment in Crypto Case ---------------------------------------------------------------------- BERNSTEIN TO FILE FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN CRYPTO CASE Claims Government's Restrictions on Export of Cryptographic Speech Violates First Amendment July 26, 1996 Electronic Frontier Foundation Contacts: Shari Steele, Staff Counsel 301/375-8856, ssteele@eff.org Mike Godwin, Staff Counsel 510/548-3290, mnemonic@eff.org Lori Fena, Executive Director 415/436-9333, lori@eff.org San Francisco, CA -- A University of Illinois at Chicago faculty member who is suing the U.S. Department of State will file a motion Friday that could strengthen his claim that government restrictions on information about cryptography violate the First Amendment's protections for freedom of speech. Relying on Judge Marilyn Hall Patel's prior ruling that computer source code is speech protected by the First Amendment, mathematician Daniel J. Bernstein will file a motion for partial summary judgment in his suit against the State Department. In his 45-page memorandum in support of his motion, Bernstein sets forth several First Amendment arguments: LEGAL ARGUMENTS * Any legal framework that requires a license for First Amendment protected speech, which may be granted or withheld at the discretion of a government official, is a prior restraint on speech. In order for this framework to be acceptable, the government has the burden of showing that publication will "surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people" and that the regulation at issue is necessary to prevent this damage. The government has not met this burden regarding the ITAR legal framework. * Because restrictions on speech about cryptography are content-based, the court must apply a strict scrutiny test in determining whether individuals can be punished for engaging in this speech. A strict scrutiny test requires that a regulation be necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. The ITAR regulatory scheme has adopted the *most* restrictive approach by prohibiting all speech in the area of cryptography. * The ITAR regulatory framework lacks the necessary procedural safeguards. Grants of administrative discretion must be limited by clear standards, and judicial review must be available. "Quite simply, the ITAR Scheme allows its administrative agencies to make inconsistent, incorrect and sometimes incomprehensible decisions censoring speech, all without the protections of judicial review or oversight." * The ITAR framework is unconstitutionally vague. The government doesn't even seem to know what its regulations include and exclude! Here, the lack of standards has allowed the government to misuse a statute aimed at commercial, military arms sales to limit academic and scientific publication. * The ITAR regulatory scheme is overbroad. In an internal memo written almost 20 years ago, the government's own Office of Legal Counsel concluded that the ITAR s licensing standards "are not sufficiently precise to guard against arbitrary and inconsistent administrative action." The OLC specifically warned that the coverage was so broad it could apply to "communication of unclassified information by a technical lecturer at a university or to the conversation of a United States engineer who meets with foreign friends at home to discuss matters of theoretical interest." This is exactly what is happening here, and it is unconstitutional. CASE BACKGROUND While a graduate student at the University of California at Berkeley, Bernstein completed the development of an encryption equation (an "algorithm") he calls "Snuffle." Bernstein wishes to publish a) the algorithm, (b) a mathematical paper describing and explaining the algorithm, and (c) the "source code" for a computer program that incorporates the algorithm. Bernstein also wishes to discuss these items at mathematical conferences, college classrooms and other open, public meetings. The Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (the ITAR regulatory scheme) required Bernstein to submit his ideas about cryptography to the government for review, to register as an arms dealer, and to apply for and obtain from the government a license to publish his ideas. Failure to do so would result in severe civil and criminal penalties. Bernstein believes this is a violation of his First Amendment rights and has sued the government. In the first phase of this litigation, the government argued that since Bernstein's ideas were expressed, in part, in source code, they were not protected by the First Amendment. On April 15, 1996, Judge Marilyn Hall Patel in the Northern District of California rejected that argument and held for the first time that computer source code is protected speech for purposes of the First Amendment. Because of its far-reaching implications, the Bernstein case is being watched closely by privacy advocates, the computer industry, the export and cryptography communities, and First Amendment activists. In fact, several members of these communities provided declarations that were submitted in support of Bernstein's motion. ABOUT THE ATTORNEYS Lead counsel on the case is Cindy Cohn of the San Mateo law firm of McGlashan & Sarrail, who is offering her services pro bono. Major additional pro bono legal assistance is being provided by Lee Tien of Berkeley; M. Edward Ross of the San Francisco law firm of Steefel, Levitt & Weiss; and James Wheaton and Elizabeth Pritzker of the First Amendment Project in Oakland. ABOUT THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is a non-profit civil liberties organization working in the public interest to protect privacy, free expression, and access to online resources and information. EFF is a primary sponsor of the Bernstein case. EFF helped to find Bernstein pro bono counsel, is a member of the Bernstein legal team, and helped collect members of the academic community and computer industry to support this case. Full text of the lawsuit and other paperwork filed in the case is available from EFF's online archives: http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/ITAR_export/Bernstein_case/ ftp.eff.org, /pub/Privacy/ITAR_export/Bernstein_case/ gopher.eff.org, 1/Privacy/ITAR_export/Bernstein_case ------------------------------ Subject:Internet Society's Strong Encryption Policy Statement ------------------------------------------------------------- IAB and IESG (divisions of the Internet Society) issued this statement on US encryption policy, yesterday, linking Internet standards bodies' positions on this crucial issue to those of civil libertarians and online businesses, in a strong front against Clinton administration key "escrow" proposals and unconstitutional restrictions on encryption export. IAB AND IESG STATEMENT ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC TECHNOLOGY AND THE INTERNET July 24, 1996 The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) and the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG), the bodies which oversee architecture and standards for the Internet, are concerned by the need for increased protection of international commercial transactions on the Internet, and by the need to offer all Internet users an adequate degree of privacy. Security mechanisms being developed in the Internet Engineering Task Force to meet these needs require and depend on the international use of adequate cryptographic technology. Ready access to such technology is therefore a key factor in the future growth of the Internet as a motor for international commerce and communication. The IAB and IESG are therefore disturbed to note that various governments have actual or proposed policies on access to cryptographic technology that either: (a) impose restrictions by implementing export controls; and/or (b) restrict commercial and private users to weak and inadequate mechanisms such as short cryptographic keys; and/or (c) mandate that private decryption keys should be in the hands of the government or of some other third party; and/or (d) prohibit the use of cryptology entirely, or permit it only to specially authorized organizations. We believe that such policies are against the interests of consumers and the business community, are largely irrelevant to issues of military security, and provide only a marginal or illusory benefit to law enforcement agencies, as discussed below. The IAB and IESG would like to encourage policies that allow ready access to uniform strong cryptographic technology for all Internet users in all countries. The IAB and IESG claim: The Internet is becoming the predominant vehicle for electronic commerce and information exchange. It is essential that the support structure for these activities can be trusted. Encryption is not a secret technology monopolized by any one country, such that export controls can hope to contain its deployment. Any hobbyist can program a PC to do powerful encryption. Many algorithms are well documented, some with source code available in textbooks. Export controls on encryption place companies in that country at a competitive disadvantage. Their competitors from countries without export restrictions can sell systems whose only design constraint is being secure, and easy to use. Usage controls on encryption will also place companies in that country at a competitive disadvantage because these companies cannot securely and easily engage in electronic commerce. Escrow mechanisms inevitably weaken the security of the overall cryptographic system, by creating new points of vulnerability that can and will be attacked. Export controls and usage controls are slowing the deployment of security at the same time as the Internet is exponentially increasing in size and attackers are increasing in sophistication. This puts users in a dangerous position as they are forced to rely on insecure electronic communication. * TECHNICAL ANALYSIS KEY SIZE It is not acceptable to restrict the use or export of cryptosystems based on their key size. Systems that are breakable by one country will be breakable by others, possibly unfriendly ones. Large corporations and even criminal enterprises have the resources to break many cryptosystems. Furthermore, conversations often need to be protected for years to come; as computers increase in speed, key sizes that were once out of reach of cryptanalysis will become insecure. PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE Use of public key cryptography often requires the existence of a "certification authority". That is, some third party must sign a string containing the user's identity and public key. In turn, the third party's key is often signed by a higher-level certification authority. Such a structure is legitimate and necessary. Indeed, many governments will and should run their own CAs, if only to protect citizens' transactions with their governments. But certification authorities should not be confused with escrow centers. Escrow centers are repositories for private keys, while certification authorities deal with public keys. Indeed, sound cryptographic practice dictates that users never reveal their private keys to anyone, even the certification authority. KEYS SHOULD NOT BE REVEALABLE The security of a modern cryptosystem rests entirely on the secrecy of the keys. Accordingly, it is a major principle of system design that to the extent possible, secret keys should never leave their user's secure environment. Key escrow implies that keys must be disclosed in some fashion, a flat-out contradiction of this principle. Any such disclosure weakens the total security of the system. DATA RECOVERY Sometimes escrow systems are touted as being good for the customer because they allow data recovery in the case of lost keys. However, it should be up to the customer to decide whether they would prefer the more secure system in which lost keys mean lost data, or one in which keys are escrowed to be recovered when necessary. Similarly, keys used only for conversations (as opposed to file storage) need never be escrowed. And a system in which the secret key is stored by a government and not by the data owner is certainly not practical for data recovery. SIGNATURE KEYS Keys used for signatures and authentication must never be escrowed. Any third party with access to such keys could impersonate the legitimate owner, creating new opportunities for fraud and deceit. Indeed, a user who wished to repudiate a transaction could claim that his or her escrowed key was used, putting the onus on that party. If a government escrowed the keys, a defendant could claim that the evidence had been forged by the government, thereby making prosecution much more difficult. For electronic commerce, non-repudiation is one of the most important uses for cryptography; and non-repudiation depends on the assumption that only the user has access to the private key. PROTECTION OF THE EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE In some cases, it is technically feasible to use cryptographic operations that do not involve secrecy. While this may suffice in some cases, much of the existing technical and commercial infrastructure cannot be protected in this way. For example, conventional passwords, credit card numbers, and the like must be protected by strong encryption, even though some day more sophisticated techniques may replace them. Encryption can be added on quite easily; wholesale changes to diverse systems cannot. CONFLICTING INTERNATIONAL POLICIES Conflicting restrictions on encryption often force an international company to use a weak encryption system, in order to satisfy legal requirements in two or more different countries. Ironically, in such cases either nation might consider the other an adversary against whom commercial enterprises should use strong cryptography. Clearly, key escrow is not a suitable compromise, since neither country would want to disclose keys to the other. MULTIPLE ENCRYPTION Even if escrowed encryption schemes are used, there is nothing to prevent someone from using another encryption scheme first. Certainly, any serious malefactors would do this; the outer encryption layer, which would use an escrowed scheme, would be used to divert suspicion. ESCROW OF PRIVATE KEYS WON'T NECESSARILY ALLOW DATA DECRYPTION A major threat to users of cryptographic systems is the theft of long-term keys (perhaps by a hacker), either before or after a sensitive conversation. To counter this threat, schemes with "perfect forward secrecy" are often employed. If PFS is used, the attacker must be in control of the machine during the actual conversation. But PFS is generally incompatible with schemes involving escrow of private keys. (This is an oversimplification, but a full analysis would be too lengthy for this document.) * CONCLUSIONS As more and more companies connect to the Internet, and as more and more commerce takes place there, security is becoming more and more critical. Cryptography is the most powerful single tool that users can use to secure the Internet. Knowingly making that tool weaker threatens their ability to do so, and has no proven benefit. ______________ The Internet Architecture Board is described at http://www.iab.org/iab The Internet Engineering Task Force and the Internet Engineering Steering Group are described at http://www.ietf.org ______________ (C) Internet Society 1996. Reproduction or translation of the complete document, but not of extracts, including this notice, is freely permitted. [end] ------------------------------ Subject: NewsNybbles -------------------- * EFF/EFC Toronto Benefit Concert Wrap-up The Eden MusicFest, a benefit concert (produced by ICONcerts) for the Electronic Frontier Foundation and it's Canadian sister organization, Electronic Frontier Canada, recently gathered more than 50,000 fans of modern rock music for a weekend camping adventure at the Mosport International Speedway, in Ontario, Canada. Set in rural farmland an hour east of Toronto, the festival staged over 40 bands in a three day period, July 12-14, 1996, and featured headliners such as the Cure, the Tragically Hip, Live, Porno For Pyros and Love and Rockets. Music began about noon each day and continued on each of two stages until close to midnight. A Netcast of the concert weekend was produced by MediaCast and included live feeds from the main stage, interviews with band members and discussions with attendant notables such as EFF Executive Director Lori Fena, via Xing StreamWorks, RealAudio, IChat, and other Internet innovations. "Music forums are one of the online "killer apps" most at risk when governments pass overly-board Internet censorship laws. Eden MusicFest was a great venue for celebrating free-speech online and raising awareness of the threats to our rights," said Fena. EFF's own Dennis Derryberry had virtual centerstage between main acts, performing an acoustic guitar-backed original song about EFF-related issues, for the cybercast and the giant twin screens on either side of the main stage. EFF's and EF-Canada's presence in the Internet Expo tent attracted the interest of many wishing to decorate themselves with a free temporary tattoo. The tattoos bore the blue ribbon--a symbol employed in recent months to promote the free expression of ideas online around the world, and a protest the Communications Decency Act and similar government Net censorship proposals in other countries. Two trailers were set up adjacent to our tent with Internet connections and Compaq terminals, allowing Internet rookies to sample the online world, and where veteran Netizens could be found checking their email every few hours. Across the pavilion from our booth, passers-by stopped to play a few chords at the Gibson Entertainment booth, where more than 20 guitars glimmered atop a table, with demonstration effects racks poised for the many music fans experiencing stage envy. After the event, all at EFF agreed that the weekend was a success not only as a benefit event, but from the perspective of having made contacts within the music and entertainment world who are sympathetic to EFF's mission to protect free speech online. Many band members wore EFF t-shirts[*] and pins during their performances, while others took time to talk about civil liberties concerns on the cybercast (and, between bands, on the stage's side screens). The simple fact that an event of this magnitude can be organized this quickly around issues of privacy and free speech on the Internet sends a clear message - these concerns are not a special interest to be swept aside, but are now a mainstream interest, a sizeable blip on the voting public's radar. It bodes well for all of us. This a very big first step in taking the "cyberliberty" message to general public, and preaching beyond the online "choir". For those of you who missed the Netcast of the festival, visit MediaCast's archives at http://www.edencast.com where you'll find many pictures, reports and other information about the happenings at Eden Music Festival. Lastly, we'd like to thank the sponsors of the event, and those who organized and staffed the event for making it all happen, as well as EF-Canada's and our own wonderful volunteers for helping run the info booth. [* Note: if you have ordered an EFF t-shirt and have not received it, do not be alarmed at this fact. The shirts arrived shortly before the festival, and are now being sent to those of you who are on a back-order list. Thanks for your patience.] ------------------------------ Upcoming Events --------------- This schedule lists EFF events, and those we feel might be of interest to our members. EFF events (those sponsored by us or featuring an EFF speaker) are marked with a "*" instead of a "-" after the date. Simlarly, government events (such as deadlines for comments on reports or testimony submission, or conferences at which government representatives are speaking) are marked with "!" in place of the "-" ("!?" means a govt. speaker may appear, but we don't know for certain yet.) And likewise, "+" in place of "-" indicates a non-USA event. If it's a foreign EFF event with govt. people, it'll be "*!+" instead of "-". You get the idea. The latest version of the full EFF calendar is available from: ftp: ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/calendar.eff gopher: gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF, calendar.eff http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/calendar.eff See also our new Now-Up-to-Date HTML calendar at: http://events.eff.org July 27- 31 + "Realigning Your Organization to Learning in the Information Age," sponsored by On the Horizon and the University of North Carolina School of Education. The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland. Contact: James Morrison Phone: +1 919 962 2517 Fax: +1 919 962 1533 Email: Morrison@unc.edu URL: http://sunsite.unc.edu/horizon July 28- 30 * Spotlight: an Executive Conference Directing the Future of Multimedia; discussion of critical issues facing interactive media industry; EFF Executive Director Lori Fena will speak; Ritz-Carlton, Laguna Niguel, CA. Tel: 415 312 0687 July 28- 31 ! The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams's 8th Conference and Workshop on Computer Security Incident Handling and Response; Santa Clara, CA URL: http://ciac.llnl.gov/firstconf Aug. 5- * Progress and Freedom Foundation; annual summit held in Aspen, 6 Colorado, will feature EFF Chairman Esther Dyson, Alvin Toffler and Congressman Rick White and Senator Bill Bradley; "An exploration of the Electronic Frontier's impact on American society." Info: +1 202 289 8928 Email to: mail@pff.org Aug. 5- 9 + International Conference on Computational Linguistics; University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark. Email: coling96@nttkb.ntt.jp Aug. 8 - Registration deadline for SAB96, Sep. 9, 1996. Aug. 8- 10 - Conference on Computing and Philosophy; Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA. Deadline for submissions: Feb. 19. Contact: +1 412 268 7643 Email: rc2z@andrew.cmu.edu URL: http://www.lcl.cmu.edu/CAAE/CAPpage.html Aug. 14- 16 + Information Seeking in Context: an International Conference on Information Needs, Seeking and Use in Different Contexts; Tampere, Finland. Deadline for submission of abstracts: October 15, 1995. Contact: +358 31 215 7039 (voice), +358 31 215 6560 (fax) Email: inf@uta.fi Aug. 14- 17 - 7th Macintosh Summit Conference; learn the latest tips, tricks and techniques of the Mac platform from the Mac giants. University of California, Santa Barbara. Contact: Fati Erdogan Tel: 805 893 2811 Fax: 805 893 4943 URL's: http://www.metatools.com/metauniv http://www.xlrn.ucsb.edu Aug. 21- 23 + China-U.S. Meeting on Global Information Access: Challenges and Opportunities; Beijing, China. Email: leeh@ohiou.edu Aug. 26 - ACM SIGCOMM '96: Applications, Technologies, Architectures and Protocols for Computer Communication; Stanford University, Stanford, CA URL: http://www.acm.org/sigcomm/sigcomm96/ ------------------------------ Subject: Quote of the Day ------------------------- "The Singapore government isn't interested in controlling information, but wants a gradual phase-in of services to protect ourselves. It's not to control, but to protect the citizens of Singapore. In our society, you can state your views, but they have to be correct." - Ernie Hai, coordinator of the Singapore Government Internet Project Find yourself wondering if your privacy and freedom of speech are safe when bills to censor the Internet are swimming about in a sea of of surveillance legislation and anti-terrorism hysteria? Worried that in the rush to make us secure from ourselves that our government representatives may deprive us of our essential civil liberties? Concerned that legislative efforts nominally to "protect children" will actually censor all communications down to only content suitable for the playground? Alarmed by commercial and religious organizations abusing the judicial and legislative processes to stifle satire, dissent and criticism? Join EFF! http://www.eff.org/EFFdocs/join_eff.html (or send any message to info@eff.org). Even if you don't live in the U.S., the anti-Internet hysteria will soon be visiting a legislative body near you. If it hasn't already. ------------------------------ Subject: What YOU Can Do ------------------------ * The Communications Decency Act & Other Censorship Legislation The Communications Decency Act and similar legislation pose serious threats to freedom of expression online, and to the livelihoods of system operators. The legislation also undermines several crucial privacy protections. Business/industry persons concerned should alert their corporate govt. affairs office and/or legal counsel. Everyone should write to their own Representatives and Senators, letting them know that such abuses of public trust will not be tolerated, that legislators who vote against your free speech rights will be voted against by you in the next elections. Join in the Blue Ribbon Campaign - see http://www.eff.org/blueribbon.html PARTICIPATE IN BLUE RIBBON ACTIVISM EFFORTS: http://www.eff.org/blueribbon/activism.html Support the EFF Cyberspace Legal Defense Fund: http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/cyberlegal_fund_eff.announce For more information on what you can do to help stop this and other dangerous legislation, see: ftp.eff.org, /pub/Alerts/ gopher.eff.org, 1/Alerts http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/ If you do not have full internet access (e.g. WWW), send your request for information to ask@eff.org. IMPORTANT! KEEP AN EYE ON YOUR LOCAL LEGISLATURE. All kinds of wacky censorious legislation is turning up at the US state and non-US national levels. Don't let it sneak by you - or by the online activism community. Without locals on the look out, it's very difficult for the Net civil liberties community to keep track of what's happening locally as well as globally. * New Crypto-Privacy Legislation Urge your Represenatitives to support the Pro-CODE crypto export bill (and to fix the few remaining bugs in it). For years US export controls on encryption have hampered the development of secure communications online. This technology is vital for online commerce, for national security, and for YOUR electronic privacy. The new Pro-CODE legislation will go a long way to rectifying the situation. Join in the Golden Key Campaign - see http://www.eff.org/goldkey.html PARTICIPATE IN GOLDEN KEY ACTIVISM EFFORTS: http://www.eff.org/goldkey/activism.html Support the EFF Cyberspace Legal Defense Fund: http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/cyberlegal_fund_eff.announce See also: http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/ http://www.privacy.org/ipc/ http://www.crypto.com/ for more info. * Digital Telephony/Comms. Assistance to Law Enforcement Act The FBI has been seeking both funding for the DT/CALEA wiretapping provisions, and preparing to require that staggering numbers of citizens be simultaneously wiretappable. To oppose the funding, write to your own Senators and Representatives urging them to vote against any appropriations for wiretapping. We are aware of no major action on this threat at present, but keep your eyes peeled. It will be back. See http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/Surveillance/ for more info. * Anti-Terrorism Bills Several bills threatening your privacy and free speech have been introduced recently. One passed, but none of the rest of them are close to passage at this very moment - however, this status may change. Urge your Congresspersons to oppose these unconstitutional and Big-Brotherish bills, which threaten freedom of association, free press, free speech, and privacy. One such bill passed a few weeks ago, stripped of some of the more onerous provisions. It could have been worse, and could yet still be worse. Keep up the pressure. Write to your legislators: No secret trials and deportations, no expansion of wiretapping scope or authority, no national or "smart-card" ID systems! For more information on some of this legislation, see http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/Terrorism_militias/ * Medical Privacy Legislation Several bills relating to medical privacy issues are floating in Congress right now. Urge your legislators to support only proposals that *truly* enhance the medical privacy of citizens. More information on this legislation will be available at http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/Medical/ soon. Bug mech@eff.org to make it appear there faster. :) * Child Privacy Legislation A new bill to protect children from unethical marketing practices (e.g. tricking kids into revealing personal information by offering prizes or games) has been introduced. EFF and other civil liberties organizations like, and dislike, various points in this bill. The legislators sponsoring the bill appear interested in resolving the problems in the statutory language they have proposed. * Find Out Who Your Congresspersons Are Writing letters to, faxing, and phoning your representatives in Congress is one very important strategy of activism, and an essential way of making sure YOUR voice is heard on vital issues. EFF has lists of the Senate and House with contact information, as well as lists of Congressional committees. These lists are available at: ftp.eff.org, /pub/Activism/Congress_cmtes/ gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Issues/Activism/Congress_cmtes http://www.eff.org/pub/Activism/Congress_cmtes/ The full Senate and House lists are senate.list and hr.list, respectively. Those not in the U.S. should seek out similar information about their own legislative bodies. EFF will be happy to archive any such information provided to us, so pass it on! If you are having difficulty determining who your US legislators are, try contacting your local League of Women Voters, who maintain a great deal of legislator information, or consult the free ZIPPER service that matches Zip Codes to Congressional districts with about 85% accuracy at: http://www.stardot.com/~lukeseem/zip.html Computer Currents Interactive has provided Congress contact info, sorted by who voted for and against the Communcations Decency Act: http://www.currents.net/congress.html * Join EFF! You *know* privacy, freedom of speech and ability to make your voice heard in government are important. You have probably participated in our online campaigns and forums. Have you become a member of EFF yet? The best way to protect your online rights is to be fully informed and to make your opinions heard. EFF members are informed and are making a difference. Join EFF today! For EFF membership info, send queries to membership@eff.org, or send any message to info@eff.org for basic EFF info, and a membership form. ------------------------------ Administrivia ============= EFFector Online is published by: The Electronic Frontier Foundation 1550 Bryant St., Suite 725 San Francisco CA 94103 USA +1 415 436 9333 (voice) +1 415 436 9993 (fax) Membership & donations: membership@eff.org Legal services: ssteele@eff.org General EFF, legal, policy or online resources queries: ask@eff.org Editor: Stanton McCandlish, Online Activist, Webmaster (mech@eff.org) This newsletter is printed on 100% recycled electrons. Reproduction of this publication in electronic media is encouraged. Signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of EFF. To reproduce signed articles individually, please contact the authors for their express permission. Press releases and EFF announcements may be reproduced individ- ually at will. 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