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DEMOCRACY AND NETWORK INTERCONNECTIVITY
May 8, 1995
Christopher R. Kedzie, kedzie@rand.org
_________________________________________________________________
Abstract
Coincident revolutions in the 1980s- breakouts of democracy around the
world and breakthroughs in the communication and information
technologies-have inspired the notion that democratic freedom and
electronic network interconnectivity might be positively correlated.
This study begins the analytic task to explore the empirical
relationship between democratization and network interconnectivity.
Despite the inherent limitations of statistical analyses, every
different analytic perspective engaged in this study coherently and
repeatedly emphasized two important observations. First,
interconnectivity consistently emerged as a powerful predictor of
democracy. Second, none of the traditional variables which measure and
guide foreign assistance policies with respect to promoting democracy
seem to cause the desired effect. Considered together, these
conclusions have important implications for policy, particularly
regarding the priority of programs which support and stimulate
international network interconnectivity.
_________________________________________________________________
Contents
* 1. Introduction
* 2. Coincident Revolutions
* 3. Empirical Analysis
+
+ 3.1 Univariate Correlation
+
+ 3.2 Multi-variate Dominance
* 4. Questions of Causality
* 5. Implications and Conclusions
Footnotes
References
Author Information
_________________________________________________________________
1. Introduction
Development, democracy and peace are linked in a scholarly tradition
and a conventional wisdom. A dominant strain holds that development
leads to democracy and, in turn, democracy leads to peace. Aristotle
is often credited for being among the earliest to recognize the first
link in this causal chain, that economic well-being and participatory
government are related. In modern times, Martin Lipset has explicitly
claimed that the former is "related causally" to the latter [1]. More
recently, Harry Rowen reaffirmed with new data the contention that
"the best way to promote democracy is to foster economic development
and education" [2]. Others, however, have maintained that causality
flows in the opposite direction. Mancur Olson, for instance, argued
that only democracies could guarantee the protection of individual
rights and contracts which are essential to investment and economic
growth [3]. The most dramatic democratic developments at the turn of
the last decade belie development-first theories. Even proponents had
to concede that "the emergence of multi-party electoral systems in
Africa and the ex-Communist states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union in the late 1980's and early 1990's will sharply reduce the
relationships [between economic development and democracy] . . .Many
extremely poor countries are now much freer than before"[4]. A third
plausible explanation for characteristically strong statistical
correlation could be a third factor which stimulates both democracy
and economic growth, for example, access to information. It is well
understood that information and communication technologies are
critical for market success. "[T]elecommunication is an
engine-probably the engine-for economic and social development"1 [5].
This paper explores the possibility that information and communication
technologies also contribute significantly to democratization.
2. Coincident Revolutions
For pundits and politicians, coincident revolutions at the end of the
1980's-breakouts of democracy around the globe and breakthroughs in
the communication and information technologies-have inspired the
notion that democratic freedom and electronic interconnectivity might
be positively correlated. Analysts have postulated this relationship.
"While governments can and have tried to control such [communications
and information] technologies for their own ends, the liberating
effects have ultimately proved to be the more powerful and, where
unfettered, have led to more competitive and adaptive societies" [6].
Writers have observed it, "Back in '89, Czech students were trying to
coordinate the uprising across the nation, and the technical students,
including Martin, were running a telecom angle. . . . The Czech secret
police were far too stupid and primitive to keep up with digital
telecommunications, so the student-radical modem network was
relatively secure from bugging and taps. . . . By mid-December, the
Civic Forum was in power" [7]. Journalists have recorded it, "the end
of the USSR demonstrates the power of information to both liberate and
destroy [8]. Politicians have claimed it to their advantage. President
Clinton, last year on Russian television, said, "Revolutions [in]
information and communication and technology and production, all these
things make democracy more likely" [9]. However, to date, all the
evidence has been anecdotal. Most common in the lore are stories of
fax messages rallying pro-democracy demonstrators outside the Chinese
"Forbidden City" and the email messages emanating from the besieged
Russian "White House" during the failed August coup.
This inquiry is intended to begin substantive examination, both
empirical and theoretical, into the relationship between new
information and communications technologies and democracy. Visual
evidence of this relationship is provocative. Figure 1 shows Freedom
House democracy ratings for all the countries of the world. Darker
shading indicate higher levels of democracy.
[IMAGE]
Figure 1-Democracy Rating
Figure 2 is a comparable world projection denoting prevalence of major
worldwide email exchanging computer networks.
[IMAGE]
Figure 2-Interconnectivity Scores
The metric used in the second chart is termed "interconnectivity"
[10]. Darker shading indicates greater level of interconnectivity.
The similarity of patterns between the two maps inspires more rigorous
analyses.
The two variables portrayed are also fundamental to the statistical
analyses that follow. Fuller explanations of these measures follow.
Generally, the concept of democracy is open to various
interpretations. For this study, democracy is defined broadly as the
combination of representative government and individual freedom.
Numerical ratings are adapted from Freedom House's Comparative Survey
of Freedom for 1993-1994 [11]. The survey produces two quantitative
measures for each country: "Political Rights," the extent to which
people freely participate in the selection of policy makers and in the
formulation of policy and "Civil Liberties," the extent to which
people are able to develop and express ideas independent of the
state's. Since the correlation between these two measures is very
high, the independent "Democracy" variable used here is the normalized
average. 2 This use of Freedom House data follows an evolving academic
practice for the evaluation of correlates to democracy [2], [4],
[12]-[16]. There are difficulties inherent to quantifying a
subjective multi-dimensional democratic quality across widely varying
governments with a single scalar [17], [18]. Despite these problems, a
practical consensus for relative rankings prevails quite broadly.
Differing attempts to provide numerical ratings show substantial
agreement. This conformity in the ordinal rankings suggests that,
although the concept of democracy may be difficult to describe
explicitly, it is well understood intuitively (at least by Western
analysts). Alex Inkeles summarized a conference on the topic of
measuring democracy with the following observation:
"[D]emocracy is a distinctive and highly coherent syndrome of
characteristics such that anyone measuring only a few of the salient
characteristics will classify nations in much the same way as will
another analyst who also measured only a few qualities but uses a
different set of characteristics, so long as both have selected
their indicators from the same larger pool of valid measures. Far
from being like the elephant confronting the blind sages, democracy
is more like a ball of wax." [17].
Prevalence of information revolution technologies would seem to be
more easily countable since tangible equipment is essential. Here too,
however, quantification difficulties exist. Some are definitional. As
the capabilities of communication technologies increasingly overlap,
recalling Ithiel de Sola Pool's "convergence of modes," [19] the
question of what is properly included becomes decidedly non-trivial.
Computers can send faxes and radio waves and television cables can
transmit email messages. Electronic mail is the specific capability of
interest in this study because it enables people to discourse across
the borders in ways that have never been possible since the evolution
of the nation state. Internationally, email is also the most mature,
most widespread, and most commonly used element of what John
Quarterman calls the "Matrix."[20] Quantifying email is difficult. Of
the numerous email networks, four are globally dominant: Internet,
BITNET, UUCP and FidoNet. Record keeping has not been regular and
accurate on all of these networks. The best available and most
comprehensive data is for the numbers of nodes which therefore
constitute the basic unit of measure for this variable.
Nodes themselves, however, are not all equivalent, even within the
same network. A node may consist of a single computer and user or an
entire organization with many of both. The Matrix Information
Directory Service (MIDS) tracks and maintains historic data on the
size of these networks aggregated by country [21]. The
"Interconnectivity" metric used here is a combined measure of MIDS
data on nodes per capita per country for each the four major computer
systems that can exchange electronic mail. Within each network,
countries are ranked and scored with a number from 0 to 4. The 0 is
assigned to all countries which do not have any nodes of a particular
network. The numbers 1 through 4 are assigned by quartile. The lowest
quartile of countries with one or more nodes for a network receive a
score of 1. The highest quartile countries receive a score of 4. The
sum of the four scores determines the level of interconnectivity on a
scale from 0 to 16.
The combined scores weight each of the four networks equally because
the ability to exchange email is a relatively generic capability.
Nevertheless, the equal weightings introduce some theoretic
difficulties. Although each of the networks support email, they are
not necessarily comparable in other respects. For instance, the
Internet, with specialized services such as the World Wide Web and
remote log on, has much more functional capacity than the others. The
discrete interconnectivity variable, therefore is neither uniform nor
strictly monotonic. It is arithmetically possible, for instance, that
a country with a low interconnectivity score and Internet may actually
have more communications capability than a country with a higher score
but no Internet. In practice this is not likely to occur and in the
analysis none of the potential degradation of this variable was
observed. There are several reasons why this theoretic possibility was
not a practical problem. First, email, not necessarily the other
services, embodies specific characteristics that are hypothesized to
have dynamic implications for democratization: the ability to conduct
multi-directional discourse3 across borders in a timely and
inexpensive manner, unbounded by geographic and institutional
constraints. Second, practical aspects of evolutionary development in
interconnectivity avoid the theoretical problems with monotonicity.
Less capable systems are also less expensive and easier to implement,
so initially they are more prevalent. Improvements on the micro-level
tend to be cumulative via successive upgrades. These often incorporate
switching to or adding on Internet capabilities. In this way, a
general progression emerges in the enhancement of interconnectivity
that this scale approximates. Furthermore, to the extent that
interconnectivity as a predictor for democracy is measured
imprecisely, the effect is reduced statistical significance of the
predictor. Thus the conclusions would still be valid from this a
fortiori analysis.
3. Empirical Analysis
Figures 1 and 2 suggest a specific conjecture that univariate analyses
support. A strong correlation between democracy and interconnectivity
does, indeed, exist.
3.1 UNIVARIATE CORRELATION
The scatterplot and accompanying regression line in Figure 3 display
this relationship graphically and the following correlation matrix in
Table 1, numerically. The correlation matrix includes a set of social
indicators [22]- [24] which are often hypothesized as democracy's
causal correlates.
[IMAGE]
Figure 3-Regression and Scatterplot
The question of causality will be addressed in detail later but as the
matrix attests, the correlation coefficient for interconnectivity is
not only large, it is substantially larger than that of any other
traditional predictors of democracy. Even the coefficient on economic
development is smaller by 0.16.
[IMAGE]
Table 1. Correlation Matrix
Economic development, reported here as a per capita GDP (and
abreviated simply as GDP), is quantified terms of purchasing power
parity, as is traditional. Education is commonly paired with economic
development as a predictor of democracy [1], [2], [15]. Direct
causality is easy to imagine. An educated public is likely to be both
more aware of political events and more capable of intervening to
influence them. Indirectly, education conceivably enhances democracy
by contributing to economic growth. The average number of years of
schooling across the entire population is considered to be the best
measure of education for analyses such as these [2].
Human development and health indicators are also often correlated with
democracy. Most prevalent in the literature are infant mortality rates
and life expectancies [13], [16]. causal argument could be posed that
as citizens become more assured of their own well-being they have more
incentive and wherewithal to demand civil rights and political
liberties. In the opposite causal direction, an empowered public could
be influential in government spending and could impel the provision of
better basic services. A democratic government is also inclined to
value more highly an individual human life. These two measures are
highly correlated, but forward causality seems more plausible in terms
of life expectancy. Individuals whose lives are extended would seem
more likely to recognize their increased personal stake in democracy
than babies who would not otherwise have survived infancy. United
Nations Development Program sources provided all the economic,
education and health data which are used in these analyses.
Cultural and ethnic factors may also have certain roles in
democratization. "Homogeneous national entities may be more likely to
evolve into peaceable democracies than states rent by harsh linguistic
and cultural antagonisms" [25]. A variable for the percentage of the
population which is comprised by the largest ethnic group in each
nation is included to account for these effects of ethnic homogeneity.
These data are published in the CIA World Fact Book [24]. In a few
cases mostly in Northern Europe and Africa these data were not
available. Where applicable, the percentage of largest religious
affiliation substituted for the missing data.
In multi-variate analyses, cultural differences across countries are
potentially more important than the internal mix. Debates continue as
to whether certain cultures or civilizations are favorably disposed or
fundamentally disinclined to embrace democratic principles [26], [27].
In either case, it is not difficult to believe that cultural aspects
influence the characterization of the political regimes and the
appreciation of personal liberties. Binary categorical variables on
region are generated to account for these effects. Demarcation between
cultures can never be exact. Inexorably, the classification of some
countries into any of the regional categories is susceptible to
quibbling. Six regional categories were defined that incorporated
elements of geography, history and religion. These six labeled Africa,
Asia, Eurasia, Latin America, Middle East, and Western Europe, map
reasonably well onto the eight civilizations identified by Sam
Huntington [26]. Western Europe also includes countries that are not
on the continent but which have a dominant Western European heritage:
United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Israel is also
included in the Western European category. The Middle East category is
predominantly Muslim, includes the Islamic North African states and
extends from and extends from Egypt to Pakistan. Africa is defined in
fairly obvious geographic terms including South Africa, minus the
northern states grouped into the Middle East. Asia includes the
Confucian countries and the Pacific Islands, plus India and Japan
(both non-Confucian), minus North Korea. Latin America stretches from
Mexico through Argentina including all the Caribbean except Cuba. Cuba
and North Korea, plus Albania and the splinter states of Yugoslavia,
in addition to the members of the former Warsaw Pact countries and are
all grouped in the Eurasian category. The effects of culture on role
of communication in society may be as profound as that on democracy.
Therefore, some of the regression models that follow include
interaction terms which are the products of the regional dummy
variables and the interconnectivity scores.
Population completes this list of independent variables. Presumably,
the size of a country could influence the type and effectiveness of
governance. Very small countries may be anomalous. Therefore, only
countries whose populations exceed 1,000,000 (and for whom data is
available) are included in this study.4 Above this threshold minimum,
country populations span more than three orders of magnitude.
Population, therefore, is best included here as an exogenous variable
in a log form.
3.2 MULTI-VARIATE DOMINANCE
Like the adjacent maps presented earlier, the correlation matrix
exhibits a surprisingly powerful correlation between interconnectivity
and democracy. Multiple linear regressions provide further convincing
evidence that one cannot dismiss this correlation as spurious.
Regression results are shown below in Table 2. Models I and II show
the resulting statistical output of ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions. Model I is an inclusive model which involves all six
predictors.
Immediately apparent is that, again, interconnectivity emerges as the
dominant predictor. More startling, perhaps, is that interconnectivity
is the only statistically significant predictor over which policy may
have any influence. The coefficient on population is also significant,
but the size of a country's population, largely inaccessible to
foreign intervention, offers scarcely few policy recommendations
(except perhaps to shine a glimmer of hope on the fractious states of
Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union which potentially may have a
more democratic future than their larger predecessors.)
None of the other predictors show a statistically significant
correlation, including economic development. Thus, the very high
statistical significance on interconnectivity is all the more
striking. With greater than 99.9% certainty, one can reject the null
hypothesis that there is no relationship between democracy and
interconnectivity. Furthermore, the coefficient on interconnectivity
is substantial in practical terms. A single point increase on the
interconnectivity scale corresponds to an increase of 5% in the
democracy ratings.
Model II contains a more parsimonious model retaining only those
predictors which showed statistical significance or have a substantial
theoretic causal basis (GDP). Not surprisingly, outputs are similar.
The drop in adjusted-R2 is minimal (0.025) for having excluded three
predictors, underlining the relative importance of those variables
retained. These few variables explain more than 50% of the variation
in democracy for 140 countries. Models III and IV, with the addition
of the regional interaction terms, are analogous to I and II,
respectively. These next two models show that the positive correlation
of interconnectivity with democracy is consistent across and within
regional boundaries. In all the regions the coefficient is positive.
In half of the regions, the coefficient is substantial and
statistically significant. The correlation is most pronounced in those
regions undergoing dramatic political transformation. This fact is
important when considering causality. If the correlation were positive
only where democracy preceded the information revolution, one might be
able to argue that the latter strengthened the former but certainly
not that the latter caused the former. The evidence, however is that
the relationship is weakest in the regions characterized by
established democracies and strongest in regions which are cultivating
nascent democracies. In Eurasia, the t-statistic indicates a level of
significance at better than the 0.1% level. In Africa, the coefficient
on the interaction term is the highest and the t-statistic corresponds
to a 1% level of significance. The coefficient is also substantial for
Latin America with a 10% significance level. The regression lines
which accompany the six scatterplots in Figure 4 approximate these
multi-variate regression results for visual comparison. Western Europe
shows the most paltry correlation. In this region, the high
interconnectivity levels do not vary much and the high democracy
ratings move even less.
[IMAGE]
Figure 4-Regional Regressions
[IMAGE]
Table 2-Regression Models
4. Questions of Causality
It is tempting to infer causality from these impressive correlations
and conclude that interconnectivity influences democratization.
However, to do so might be premature. Causality could, in fact, flow
in the opposite direction. Democracies rely on an informed public and
uninhibited communication and may therefore seek interconnectivity.
One way to test this possibility analytically is via a system of
simultaneous equations to be resolved by two-stage least squares
(2SLS) estimation. Both democracy and interconnectivity are endogenous
in Model V. Instrumental variables for interconnectivity are
determinable from the characteristics of email. Electronic mail is
text based and travels over telephones lines. Appropriate instruments,
therefore, are percent literacy and the number of telephone lines per
capita. Exogenous variables in the democracy equation are, as before,
related to economic growth and human development.
The resulting regression coefficients are also listed above on Table
2. Interconnectivity is shown to be an even better predictor of
democracy than before. The magnitude of the coefficient for
interconnectivity on democracy is greater than in the OLS models. The
level of significance remains above the 0.1% level. Democracy,
however, does not prove to have any significant effect on
interconnectivity. Thus, the suggestion that democracy leads to
interconnectivity is not supported and the hypothesis that there is no
positive effect cannot be rejected. The coefficient on population is
still significant and negative. In this model, GDP is also negatively
correlated to democracy and statistically significant. This supports
the notion of some scholars that democracy is not costless [28], [29].
All else being equal, such as interconnectivity and population,
greater economic development might be available only at the expense of
democratization. Proponents of Pinochet and Lee Kuan Yu models for
development have made similar arguments.
The other alternative explanation for the strong correlation between
interconnectivity and democracy is that a third variable may influence
both simultaneously. The obvious candidate is economic development
which many contend is an important prerequisite for democratization.
The correlation between interconnectivity and GDP, at 0.84, is also
very high, suggesting that the third variable hypothesis deserves
further examination. In practical terms, the equipment necessary to
communicate electronically is expensive, especially for citizens of
the Third World regions which Western democratization policy would be
most eager to influence. The same economic resources which can finance
participation in the communications revolution could conceivably fuel
demands for personal rights and freedoms. Again, a system of
simultaneous equations can help unravel complex reciprocal effects.
Model VI includes all three variables, GDP, democracy and
interconnectivity as endogenous. Each is included in the forcing
function for the other two. The interconnectivity equation utilizes
the same two instrumental variables. The exogenous variables in the
democracy equation are the same as before except that schooling, which
has never been a statistically significant predictor for democracy in
this set of models, switches over to serve as an instrument for
economic growth. As noted earlier, scholars have surmised that
education can influence democracy by increasing personal and national
wealth. The 2SLS estimation results, shown in Table 2, are consistent
with all those that preceded and do not support the hypothesis of
economic development as the confounding third variable. Strongly to
the contrary, the regression coefficients for interconnectivity on
democracy and GDP are both substantial and statistically significant,
again above the 0.1% level. Neither democracy nor GDP proves to
strongly influence interconnectivity. GDP again shows a negative
correlation with democracy but at a weaker significance level, 20%.
In each model presented here, without exception, interconnectivity
positively correlates with democracy at the highest levels of
significance. In each model, at lower but still high significance, the
correlation with population on democracy is negative. Stories to
explain both the country size and the interconnectivity phenomena may
share a common plot. Smaller size and greater interconnectivity may
similarly be conducive to democracy by facilitating coordinated civic
action. Although it might by now be on its way towards becoming
cliché, the often repeated analogy that information revolution
technologies are shrinking the world offers appropriate insight.
Interestingly, the most populous country which Freedom House labels as
completely "free" became a democracy in 1776 when its population was
only a fraction of its current size. At that time and at that size,
available communication technologies, like pamphleteering, were
sufficient to gel public support into popular action.
It is the globe, however, not just countries which are "shrinking" in
the wash of information flows. The worldwide expansion of democracy
may have less to do with the way in which these technologies favor
democratic processes domestically than the way they spread democratic
ideals internationally. In an inward direction from the perspective of
the citizens of a prospective democracy, information revolution
technologies enable them to learn more about how other societies
operate. If they discover that others living elsewhere are living
better thanks to the democratic governance "over there," they are
likely to demand some of that democratization for themselves. For this
reason the Soviets jammed broadcasts from the West. Several of my
Russian associates have expressed that they felt fortunate to have
been born in a communist state until learned what life was really like
in America. In an outward direction, information revolution
technologies empower citizens anywhere to broadcast to the world
infractions against their "inalienable rights" by their own
government. Thus world pressure can be brought to bear against
repressive regimes which can no longer hide their misdeeds as
successfully as before. That demonstrators in Tian An Men Square
displayed signs written in English was not a coincidence. Cross-border
communication in the defense of democracy and human rights is the
activity on which citizen diplomacy groups like Amnesty International
stake their success. The new technologies enhance these capabilities.
Governments that try to squelch the new information technologies in
order to protect their monopoly on power, do so essentially at the
peril of economic growth. This is the inference from Model VI and is
precisely what leading analysts have been predicting, "For nations to
be economically competitive, they must allow individual citizens
access to information networks and computer technology. In doing so,
they cede significant control over economic, cultural, and eventually
political events in their countries" [30].
5. Implications and Conclusions
Despite the inherent limitations of statistical analysis, every
different analytic perspective of this study coherently and repeatedly
emphasizes two important observations. First, interconnectivity
consistently emerges as a powerful predictor of democracy. In
univariate analysis, the correlation coefficient for interconnectivity
on democracy is larger than that of any other variable. As a variable
in an ordinary least squares multiple linear regression,
interconnectivity is the dominant predictor in all models. As an
interaction term in conjunction with regional categorical variables,
the correlation of interconnectivity with democracy is everywhere
positive, and has both the largest substantive value and greatest
statistical significance in regions characterized by dynamic political
transformations. As an endogenous variable in systems of simultaneous
equations, interconnectivity always proves to be a significant
predictor of democracy and economic development, but never was the
reverse true. These analytic results overlay a background of mounting
anecdotal evidence that new information and communication technologies
are facilitating democratic change worldwide.
Second, none of the traditional variables which measure and guide
foreign assistance policies with respect to promoting democracy and
peace seem to produce the desired effect. The only statistically
significant policy variable that appears in any of the models is
economic development and its regression coefficient on democracy in
those models is negative.
The minimum policy implication, when considering these conclusions
together, is that the effects of revolutionary information and
communication technologies on the objectives of foreign aid and
national security must be better understood, and the search for
appropriate policy instruments is a critical aspect of further study.
At a maximum, the priority of policies regarding international
communication should be at least as high as the priority for foreign
economic development and perhaps as high as that of some national
security programs. References
_________________________________________________________________
Footnotes
1
Emphasis in original.
2
Freedom House rates countries on an decreasing basis from 7 to
1 in both categories, civil liberties and political rights. A
ranking of "1" indicates the highest relative accordance with
the principles of democracy, and a ranking of "7," the lowest
[11]. The normalized average used here and elsewhere converts
the scale to one which increases from 0 to 100, such that
maximum democracy has the highest rating. See Rowen [2] or
Muller and Seligson [12] for other examples.
3
The essence of multi-directional communication is that all
people who receive information via a certain information
channel can participate equally within the complete and
identical context of the discussion. Another term commonly used
to describe multi-directional communication has been
"many-to-many." However, this term can be misleading. The
connotation of "many" in one-to-many can be the billion or so
people around the globe who watch soccer's World Cup which
would of course be impossibly unwieldy for many-to-many. More
importantly, quantifying the number of participants misses the
most critical aspect of multi-directional communication.
Independent of the how many people are involved-even if there
are only three-email technology creates a different dynamic and
thus can be expected to have differing social and political
outcomes.
4
Data were either missing or relative to inconsistent entities
for many of the new countries resulting from the recent
breakups of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Therefore excluded
from this study are the Czech and Slovak Republics,
Bosnia-Herzogovina, Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia. Additionally
critical missing data precluded the inclusion of Taiwan.
_________________________________________________________________
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_________________________________________________________________
Author Information
Christopher R. Kedzie has earned degrees in Aeronautical Engineering
at the U.S Air Force Academy (B.S. 1982) and Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, 1984 (S.M. 1984), and in Public Policy at Harvard
University (M.P.P. 1992). He is currently a doctoral fellow at the
RAND Graduate School where his primary research efforts focus on the
effects of information revolution technologies in the arena of
international affairs. Before coming to RAND, he was a founder and
director of organizations in both Ukraine and Uzbekistan which
exploited information revolution technologies to support economic and
political reform in the republics of the former Soviet Union.
Chris Kedzie can be contacted at:
2101 Ocean Avenue, #3
Santa Monica, CA 90405
310-393-0411 x6885
kedzie@rand.org
_________________________________________________________________
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