

From: [participant]@eff.org
Sent: Thursday, May 09, 2002 1:56 PM
To: 'bpdg-tech@list.lmicp.com'; [...]
Cc: eff-ip@eff.org
Subject: BPDG: Comments on exsiting draft requirements

<[participant]@eff.org>
To: Broadcast Protection Discussion Group and co-chairs

From: Electronic Frontier Foundation, Open Source Initiative, Linux Journal, O'Reilly and Associates, Vereniging Open Source Nederland, Ximian, Inc., The GNOME Foundation, Free Software Foundation, Bob Young

Re: Comments on exsiting draft requirements

Our comments are based on the "Requirements for the Protection of Unencrypted Digital Terrestrial Broadcast Content Against Unauthorized Redistribution, Discussion Draft, April 25, 2002".

We object to the basic thrust of the BPDG draft Compliance and Robustness Rules. Manufacturers and the public, including hobbyists and individual technologists, have a basic right of inquiry, to access any unencrypted signal and to process it as they wish. No technological restrictions on the ability to process, record, transmit, play, or otherwise handle signals should be created, promulgated, or perpetuated.

In particular:

"Covered Product" means a product (whether a physical device, software or combination thereof) that is required under Section X.2 to comply with the Compliance Requirements, and to be manufactured in accordance with Robustness Requirements, prior to being sold or distributed.

...

X.2

[Note to BPDG: it is assumed for purposes of technical evaluation that the instrument promulgating the Compliance Requirements and Robustness Requirements below would include provisions that specify the circumstances under which the Compliance Requirements and Robustness Requirements would apply. This Section X.2 is a placeholder for such provisions. ...]

We object to the idea that products should EVER be required to follow the Compliance Requirements or the Robustness Requirements created by this ad-hoc group of self-interested parties.

We see no valid justification for making such a requirement. We see no reasonable means of enforcing such a requirement without violating basic rights foundational to our society, such as freedom of inquiry, robust public debate, and freedom of the press.

X.3 Compliance Requirements: Unscreened Content.

(a) A Covered Product shall not pass, or direct to be passed, Unscreened Content to any output except ...

(b) A Covered Product shall not record or cause the recording of Unscreened Content in digital form unless such recording is made using one of the following methods ...

We believe that Covered Products should have no technological restrictions on what they can do with Unencrypted Digital Terrestrial Broadcast Content (which all Unscreened Content is).

We further believe that Covered Products should have no obligation to "Screen" Unencrypted Digital Terrestrial Broadcast Content.

We believe that section X.3 should be deleted in its entirety.

This is a substantive disagreement with the draft that claims to represent a consensus of the membership.

X.4 Compliance Requirements: Marked Content.

(a) A Covered Product shall not pass, or direct to be passed, Marked Content to any output except ...

(b) A Covered Product shall not record or cause the recording of Marked Content in digital form unless such recording is made using one of the following methods ...

We believe that Covered Products which do choose, for whatever reason, to examine the Broadcast Flag, should have no technological restrictions on what they can do with Unencrypted Digital Terrestrial Broadcast Content (which all Marked Content is).

We believe that section X.4 should be deleted in its entirety.

This is a substantive disagreement with the draft that claims to represent a consensus of the membership.

X.5 [Audio. Except as otherwise provided in Sections X.3(a) or X.4(a), Covered Products shall not output the audio portions of Unscreened Content or of Marked Content in digital form except ...

We believe that Covered Products should have no restrictions on what they can do with the audio portions of Unencrypted Digital Terrestrial Broadcast Content.

We believe that Section X.5 should be deleted in its entirety.

This is a substantive disagreement with the draft that claims to represent a consensus of the membership.

X.6 Integrated Add-in Covered Products. Where a Covered Product passes Unscreened Content or Marked Content from such Covered Product to another product ... it shall so pass such content [(a) protected by an Authorized Digital Output Protection Technology, in accordance with any obligations set out on Table A applicable to such Authorized Digital Output Protection Technology or (b)] using a Robust Method. Neither Unscreened Content nor Marked Content may be so passed in unencrypted, compressed form via a User Accessible Bus.

We believe that Covered Products should have no restrictions on how they pass Unencrypted Digital Terrestrial Broadcast Content to other products.

We believe that Section X.6 should be deleted in its entirety.

This is a substantive disagreement with the draft that claims to represent a consensus of the membership.

X.7 Robustness: Construction

(a) Covered Products shall be manufactured in a manner clearly designed to effectively frustrate [User] attempts to modify such Covered Products ...

We believe that it is desirable for Covered Products to be manufactured such that users may modify the Covered Products. We believe that innovation, technical progress, and

user satisfaction are all improved by user-modifiable products. Such products should never be foreclosed from entering the market.

We believe that Section X.7 should be deleted in its entirety.

This is a substantive disagreement with the draft that claims to represent a consensus of the membership.

X.8 Robustness: Data Paths. Within a Covered Product, neither Unscreened Content nor Marked Content shall be present on any User Accessible Bus in unencrypted, compressed form.

We believe that it is desirable for Covered Products to present Unencrypted Digital Terrestrial Broadcast Content on User Accessible Buses. This is the standard practice in the computer and consumer electronics industry, and the heart of interoperability of products from multiple vendors.

We believe that Section X.8 should be deleted in its entirety.

This is a substantive disagreement with the draft that claims to represent a consensus of the membership.

X.9 Methods of Making Functions Robust. Covered Products shall be manufactured using at least the following techniques ...

We believe that Covered Products should be able to be manufactured using any techniques desired by the manufacturer.

We believe that Section X.9 should be deleted in its entirety.

This is a substantive disagreement with the draft that claims to represent a consensus of the membership.

X.10 Robust Methods. Where a Covered Product passes, or directs to be passed, Unscreened Content or Marked Content from such Covered Product to another product pursuant to Sections X.3(a)(3), X.3(a)(4), [X.4(a)(3),] X.4(a)(4) or X.6(b), it shall do so using²³ [a method designed to ensure that such content, in any usable form, shall be reasonably secure from being intercepted, redistributed or copied when being so passed to such other product]. Where a Covered Product passes, or directs to be passed, Unscreened Content or Marked Content to an output pursuant to Sections X.3(a)(3), X.3(a)(4) or X.4(a)(3), it shall do so using [a method that ...technical criteria to be specified] [an Authorized Digital Output Protection Technology or other means that provides technological protection against unauthorized redistribution of such content that is at least as effective as such technological protection provided by any one of the Authorized Digital Output Protection Technologies].

We believe that when a Covered Product passes Unencrypted Digital Terrestrial Broadcast Content to another product, it should be able to use any method.

We believe that Section X.10 should be deleted in its entirety.

This is a substantive disagreement with the draft that claims to represent a consensus of the membership.

X.11 Level of Protection. The content protection requirements set forth in the Compliance Requirements and the requirements set forth in Sections X.7(c) and X.8 shall be implemented in a reasonable method so that they ...

(a) Cannot be defeated or circumvented [by a User] merely by using

general-purpose tools or equipment that are widely available at a reasonable price, such as screwdrivers ...

We believe that Covered Products should be able to be modified using general-purpose tools that are widely available at a reasonable price, such as screwdrivers. User-accessible products are desired by the public for their flexibility, lower repair costs, and ease of modification. Products deliberately built with parts that have unreasonable prices, special-purpose tools, or widely-unavailable parts or tools are more expensive, harder to maintain, and less flexible.

(b) Can only with difficulty be defeated or circumvented using professional tools or equipment, such as logic analyzers ...

We believe that whether Covered Products can easily be reverse-engineered by competent professional engineers should be a decision made by each manufacturer, based on their analysis of their competitive situation. Some makers of Covered Products do not wish to hide the internal operation of their Products. There should be no requirement that they do so.

We believe that Section X.11 should be deleted in its entirety.

This is a substantive disagreement with the draft that claims to represent a consensus of the membership.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation has participated fully in the discussions of the Broadcast Protection Discussion Group. It has shared its concerns and ideas with the group, and brought in outside evidence to support its positions. It has encouraged other interested parties to join the discussions. It has sought to have its issues explored and addressed by the Discussion Group and by the broader society from which the Discussion Group is drawn.

Our issues have been discussed, but have not been reflected in the drafts prepared by the co-chairs. There appears to be some support for some or all of our positions among other members of the Discussion Group. We perceive that no consensus exists on these issues. We believe that the draft report is not only incorrect in failing to report the lack of consensus, but that it is part of a deliberate attempt to force a particular outcome on the so-called consensus process.

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