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EFF/Pavlovich Petition for Review to CA Supreme Courtin DVD-CCA v. McLaughlin, Pavlovich, et al. (Sep. 11, 2000)Appellate Court No. H021961
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
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MATTHEW PAVLOVICH, |
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Supreme Court No. ____________ |
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Petitioner. |
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vs. |
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
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Respondent. |
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Trial Judge: Hon. William J. Elfving |
DVD COPY CONTROL ASSOCIATION, INC., |
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Real Party in Interest. |
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PETITION FOR REVIEW AFTER DECISION BY COURT OF APPEAL,
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALLONN E. LEVY (Bar No. 187251)
HUBER & SAMUELSON APC
210 North Fourth Street, Suite 400
San Jose, CA 95112
Telephone: (408) 295-7034
Facsimile: (408) 295-5799
Attorneys for Petitioner
Matthew Pavlovich
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES......
I. PETITION FOR REVIEW......
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW......
A. SUMMARY OF REASONS FOR REVIEW......
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE......
A. PROCEDURAL FACTS......
B. JURISDICTIONAL FACTS......
1. Situs and Identification of Parties......
2. Factual Summary......
IV. ARGUMENT......
A. COMPELLING REASONS EXIST FOR THIS COURT TO
GRANT THE PETITION FOR REVIEW......
B.
THE EXPRESS AIMING REQUIREMENT IN CALDER
OUGHT TO PROPERLY BE READ AS REQUIRING AN
INTENTIONAL DIRECTION OF CONSEQUENCES AIMED
AT A KNOWN PARTY IN THE FORUM STATE......
C. CALIFORNIA
OUGHT NOT EXERCISE JURISDICTION
BASED SOLELY UPON THE EXISTENCE OF ALLEGED
EFFECTS FELT BY INDUSTRIES REPUTED TO EXIST IN
CALIFORNIA......
V. CONCLUSION......
ENDNOTES
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
FEDERAL CASES
Bancroft & Masters Inc. v. Augusta National Inc. (9th Cir.2000),
__ F.3d __, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 20917,
2000 C.D.O.S 6941, 2000 D.A.R. ......
Edmunds v. Superior Court (1994), 24 Cal. App. 4th 221 ...... Cal. Civil Code §3426......
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT, AND THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA:
MATTHEW PAVLOVICH, defendant and petitioner, respectfully
petitions for review following the decision of the Court of Appeal, Sixth
Appellate District, (per Hon. Eugene M. Premo, Acting P.J.), filed on
October 11, 2000.
1) Whether jurisdiction is available in California under the Calder
effects test, based exclusively on Internet effects, where there is no
evidence of "express aiming" directed at a particular, known,
California party.
2) Whether California may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant on
the basis that: The defendant knew or should have known that his
acts would have an effect on industries generally reputed to exist in
California ("general industry effects"), where no other California
contacts exist.
The Calder effects test has provided State Courts with a
framework within which to develop jurisdictional jurisprudence. However,
as recent California Court decisions have noted, it has also created everincreasing
confusion over the precise definition of the "express aiming"
requirement and of the boundaries of the Calder test in general.
The ambiguities in the Calder test have led to confusion and
seemingly divergent opinions in numerous Internet jurisdiction cases.
Indeed, here the Sixth Appellate district found jurisdiction based solely
upon Internet publication of information while the Second Appellate
district found no such jurisdiction on strikingly similar facts (Jewish
Defense Organization Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 72 Cal.App.3d 1427).
Divergent opinions are also found in the Federal Courts which have dealt
with the same issues
The ambiguity regarding the existence of Internet-based
jurisdiction has arisen in this case, and will continue to arise as the
additional non-resident defendants (totaling at least 17 named individual
non-resident defendants and an unknown additional number of identified
and unidentified doe defendants) are served. Additionally, this issue will
continually arise in the slew of other Internet cases currently winding
through the courts as individuals and companies endeavor to settle
Internet related disputes.
If Courts undertake an expansive reading of the "express aiming"
requirement and the Calder test in general, both Internet and non-Internet
cases will rapidly increase throughout California. New cases will
continually be filed based upon the holding that only forum related
"general industry effects" must be present to sustain jurisdiction. This
will create a burden on both the court system and non-resident
defendants.
Because of the wide net cast by the plaintiffs in this case and
because of the controversial subject matter of the case, mainstream and
industry-specific press have followed this case closely. As such, the
public posture of this case will necessarily shape the manner in which
industry and individuals make future decisions regarding their interaction
on the Internet - either chilling on-line speech and commerce, or
permitting it to continue to expand. It is imperative that this Court seize
the opportunity to review this matter and clarify this important area of
cyber-jurisdictional jurisprudence.
This is an Internet re-publication case wherein Petitioner, is alleged
to have been involved in the web site re-publication of information alleged
to have contained Real Party in Interest's trade secrets. The original
development and publication of the information is alleged to have
originated from one or more residents of foreign countries who posted the
information on the Internet.
Petitioner, MATTHEW PAVLOVICH (hereafter PAVLOVICH ) is a
defendant in the underlying action and is a party beneficially interested
herein. Respondent is the Superior Court of Santa Clara County
On December 27, 1999, Real Party in Interest, DVD CCA, filed in
Respondent Court against this Petitioner, as defendant, a complaint
numbered CV786804 alleging a single cause of action - misappropriation of
trade secrets (Civ.Code §3426 et seq.). The trade secret misappropriation
cause of action is based on the allegation that Petitioner republished
information that is alleged to have been misappropriated by a third party
or parties and repeatedly republished throughout the Internet. Petitioner
is one of some 521 named and Doe defendants who have been sued for
allegedly republishing this information on the Internet - many of whom
are non-residents. Numerous other publishers of the same information
have not been sued. Plaintiff and real party in interest is a not-for-profit
trade association whose sole purpose is to license the information known
as the Content Scrambling System or CSS.
Real party in interest alleges that portions of its CSS Technology
were was misappropriated by a third party and partially incorporated into a
new technology called DeCSS. Real party in interest alleges that after the
third party creator of DeCSS posted DeCSS on the Internet, Petitioner and
other defendants discovered the information posted on the Internet, and
themselves further republished the information on various other Internet
web sites
Petitioner made no general appearance in Respondent Court.
Rather, on June 6, 2000, Petitioner appeared specially in Respondent Court
(pursuant to the provisions of §418.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure) by
filing a motion to quash service of summons on the grounds that the
Respondent Court lacked jurisdiction over the person of defendant
A hearing was held by Respondent Court on August 29, 2000 at
approximately 9:00 a.m. in Department two of the Santa Clara County
Superior Court. An order denying Petitioner's motion to quash service of
summons for lack of jurisdiction was served by mail on all parties on
August 30, 2000
This is an information re-publication case wherein the plaintiff,
DVD CCA, seeks to enjoin Petitioner PAVLOVICH and some 521 other
defendants from republishing a piece of computer code identified as
DeCSS. When implemented by a user, DeCSS can enable consumers to
play lawfully purchased DVDs without the use of a software DVD player
licensed by real party DVD CCA. DVD CCA operates solely as the
licensor of the Content Scrambling System or "CSS" technology. DeCSS
is particularly useful for users of open-source computer operating systems
since such systems do not currently offer DVD players licensed by DVD
CCA. An example of such an open-source computer operating system is
the popular Linux operating system.
Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to restrain the defendants right to
republish this speech
Real Party in Interest, Plaintiff, DVD CCA is a Delaware corporation
with offices located in Morgan Hill, California, and is the licensing entity
for the technology known as CSS (APP.p.4; Complaint at p.3:12-17).
Petitioner, Defendant, PAVLOVICH is an out-of-state resident
served by U.S. mail while a student in Indiana and currently residing in
Texas (APP.pp.66-68; Declaration of PAVLOVICH at pp.1-3).
Petitioner's involvement in this case is limited to his role as an
alleged republisher of the DeCSS code while enrolled as a full-time student
at the University in Indiana (APP.p.66-68; Declaration of PAVLOVICH 2:1-
5; 2:8-27). Plaintiff has alleged that Petitioner PAVLOVICH is responsible
for the posting
In reality, PAVLOVICH did not own or operate any site that
published DeCSS, however he did concede for purposes of the motion to
quash that he had input
The LiVid group which allegedly published the DeCSS code was a
loose association of volunteers who were involved in Linux open-source
projects involving various forms of video playback
Petitioner PAVLOVICH has no connection with California.
PAVLOVICH does not reside in California and does not have any regular
clients or work in California (APP.pp67-68; Declaration of PAVLOVICH at
pp.2-3). Furthermore, PAVLOVICH has never: solicited business in
California; designated a registered agent for service of process in
California; maintained a place of business in California; maintained a
telephone listing in California; maintained a bank account in California; or
even visited California for any business purpose (APP.p.68; Declaration of
PAVLOVICH at 3:2-7). The web site DVD CCA attributes to PAVLOVICH
was a "passive" web-site that did not involve the interactive exchange of
information with users, did not solicit or engage in business activities, and
did not solicit contact with California residents (APP.pp.67; Declaration of
PAVLOVICH at 2:18-27). Further, Petitioner did not know of DVD CCA's
existence, much less its situs in California, prior to the filing of this lawsuit
and has never done business with DVD CCA (APP.p.68; Declaration of
PAVLOVICH at 3:7-9). Petitioner neither directed nor "expressly aimed"
any activity or contact towards California, much less any activity or
contact specifically related to the trade secret cause of action that is the
subject of this suit (APP.pp.66-68; Declaration of PAVLOVICH at pp.1-3;
Exhibit D, at APP.pp.168-169,178, 179, 180, 185; Deposition of
PAVLOVICH at pp.11-12, 44:4-12, 48:22-25, 52:2-11, 91:22-25).
Real Party in Interest does not contest the fact that PAVLOVICH
has had no contact with California or the fact that he did not know the
identity of the only plaintiff in this case (see Opposition to Petition for
Writ of Mandate, hereinafter "OPP," generally and at pp.11-12). DVD
CCA argues that the lack of express aiming directed at DVD CCA is
irrelevant to the jurisdictional analysis (OPP at p.12) and that jurisdiction
may be found solely based upon effects on the computer and movie
industries which are reputed to exist in California (OPP at p.11-13).
Pursuant to Cal. Rule of Court 29, this Court is empowered to
review appellate decisions under specified, narrow, circumstances. These
unusual circumstances are evident in the instant case.
This case presents important questions of law in one of the most
critical areas of State law - that of jurisdictional jurisprudence. At a base
level, jurisdictional issues arise in every single case, so it is rare to
uncover unresolved questions within this area of law. However, with the
widespread acceptance of the Internet, Courts are facing different
situations than those previously seen, giving rise to new questions of law
that are destined to recur as Internet cases become more prevalent.
In the landmark case of Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), the
Supreme Court held that jurisdiction may be found, within the confines of
due process, where certain intentional acts are "expressly aimed", and
cause foreseeable harm in the forum state. Subsequent Courts have noted
that due process provisions and Calder require "something more" than
simply foreseeable effects in the forum state (Panavision Int'l, L.P. v.
Toeppen, (9th Cir. 1998) 141 F.3d 1316, 1322, but have not defined what the
"something more" is and have not defined the boundaries of "express
aiming."
Although itself not an Internet case, the Calder case was an
information re-publication case. As such, the Calder test has, in varying
degrees, become the primary basis for jurisdictional analysis in Internet
cases. The importance of the Calder test in Internet cases arises out of
the high-speed, transient, nature of information on the Internet and the
effects brought about by that information. In applying the Calder holding
to the Internet arena, the boundaries of the Calder effects test itself, as
well as the specific "express aiming" requirement cry out for definition and
clarification. Without such definition, California Courts and litigants will
continue to struggle with jurisdictional questions resulting in a lack of
uniformity among similar Court cases and in confusion by industry
participants.
Settling the important questions of law raised in this petition will
necessarily assist California Courts and parties in evaluating the
elementary issue of jurisdiction which arises in many cases and in nearly
all high technology and Internet based cases. The precedent set by this
Court would not only apply to the 17 named non-resident defendants
already included in this case, but it will also apply to the numerous other
Internet and non-Internet cases winding through California Courts and
relying on the "effects test" as a basis for jurisdiction.
In the new global economy, questions about the boundaries of the
"effects test" as applied in California frequently arise. As industry and
individuals assess their levels of risk and resulting ability to do business
and otherwise interact on the Internet, participants will look to this Court
to answer these recurring legal questions regarding how far the "effects
test" reaches in California. Thus, the resolution of these jurisdictional
issues is not only pivotal to the resolution of Internet litigation, but also is
important to industry participants who will adjust their daily interactions
based on the outcome of this case.
California Courts have struggled with the boundaries of the
"effects test" for some time. In a recent decision, the Ninth Circuit
candidly noted the confusion among the courts:
Subsequent cases have struggled somewhat with Calder's
import, recognizing that the case cannot stand for the broad
proposition that a foreign act with foreseeable effects in the
forum state always gives rise to specific jurisdiction. We
have said that there must be something more, but have not
spelled out what that something more must be. See
Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322.
We now conclude that something more is what the
Supreme Court described as express aiming at the forum
state. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. Express aiming is a
concept that in the jurisdictional context hardly defines
itself. From the available cases, we deduce that the
requirement is satisfied when the defendant is alleged to
have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff
whom the defendant knows to be a resident of the forum
state.
Bancroft & Masters Inc. v. Augusta National Inc. (9th Cir.2000) __ f.3d
__, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 20917, 2000 C.D.O.S 6941, 2000 D.A.R. 9197 at
*10-14 (a courtesy copy of the decision has previously been provided to
opposing counsel and is attached hereto as exhibit C for the court's
convenience pursuant to Cal.Rule of Court 28(e)5).
The Bancroft Court supplied some clarification on the issue of
"express aiming" but did not provide actual boundaries demonstrating
what facts do not satisfy the "express aiming" requirement.
Other California Courts have also wrestled with the boundaries of
the "effects test" in California
Thus, the lower Court here found that despite the holding in
Bancroft, express aiming may still be satisfied without the targeting of a
specific named party. Additionally, the Appellate Court held that "general
industry effects" as defined above are sufficient to satisfy the Calder test.
The lower Court's decision would seem to stand in contrast to the
Internet publication cases of Bancroft, Jewish Defense, Cybersell and to
some extent Panavision. However, without clarification on the issues
outlined in this petition, industry participants, litigants and Courts
attempting to analyze the divergent decisions will be stymied in their
attempts to predict the legal outcome of a given jurisdictional dispute.
Petitioner contends that if DVD CCA's theories of jurisdiction are
permitted to stand, nearly limitless jurisdiction will exist in California.
However, without review, the result will be even more damaging as the
vast numbers of individuals affected by and following this case will be left
with confusion rather than a solid understanding of the pivotal issue of
"effects" based jurisdiction.
In its opposition, DVD CCA argues that "Petitioner's claim that he
did not know DVD CCA's name or location until commencement of this
lawsuit (Petition, p.25) is irrelevant" (OPP at p.12). It is petitioner's
contention that the entire foundation for the "effects test" as a basis for
jurisdiction that complies with due process is the intentional direction of
harmful activity "expressly aimed" at a particular party within the forum
state. Without the purposeful direction of activity intentionally directed
at a particular party, the Calder test is rendered meaningless in that it
would allow for jurisdiction anytime a resident plaintiff is affected by the
acts of a non-resident - such a reading would conflict with the
Constitutional guarantees of due process.
In analyzing the jurisdictional facts, the Calder Court made it clear
that in publishing its information, the defendant in Calder knew the
identity of the plaintiff, knew the plaintiff lived in the forum state and knew
that the information it was publishing would likely have an adverse effect
on that particular plaintiff (Calder at 789-790 and generally). The same is
true for the defendant in Panavision, supra (relied upon by the trial Court
in its order, see APP p.225; Trial Court order at p.1) and those defendants
in other "effects test" cases where jurisdiction has been upheld
In the instant case, PAVLOVICH could not have expressly aimed
his conduct at DVD CCA (the sole plaintiff in this case). At the time the
re-publication of DeCSS occurred, PAVLOVICH was a student at Purdue
University and had never heard of DVD CCA. Since petitioner couldn't
have targeted DVD CCA, any activity that affected DVD CCA would have
been simply fortuitous or random
It is well settled that in order to comply with due process, any
exercise of jurisdiction must satisfy minimum contacts, fair play and
substantial justice (Burger King v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 472,
476-478). the "express aiming" requirement ought to properly be read as
requiring actual direction of activity aimed at a named party in order to
fulfill the foreseeability and purposeful availment elements of due process
(id.). Unless an individual actually directs conduct at a known entity, he or
she cannot be said to truly be undertaking intentional conduct, expressly
aimed at California known to have a potentially devastating impact upon a
party in California (see Calder at 789-790). To hold otherwise renders the
"express aiming" requirement abstruse, indefinite, speculative, and
essentially meaningless.
Real Party in Interest argues that jurisdiction is available because
"Petitioner both knew and should have known that the effect of his
conduct would be to harm . . . California enterprises" (OPP at p.12).
Petitioner denotes this general knowledge of an effect on a particular
industry or industries reputed to exist in California as "general industry
effects." Petitioner contends that neither Calder, nor its progeny was
envisioned as permitting such "general industry effects" as a basis for
jurisdiction consistent with due process guarantees. Were such a reading
of the Calder test permitted to stand, the result would be a dramatic
increase in jurisdiction encompassing all cases with subject matters that
touch upon industries reputed to exist in the forum state.
The Calder "effects test" is one of many tests for personal
jurisdiction. It is a particular form of "purposeful availment" required in all
specific jurisdiction cases. As such, the requirements of the test must
comply with traditional Due Process safeguards.
The constitutional cornerstone of due process analysis is "whether
the defendant purposefully established 'minimum contacts' in the forum"
(Burger King at 474). "[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process
analysis . . . is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum . . .are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there." (id.; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 444
U.S. 286, 295). "It is essential in each case that there be some act by which
the defendant purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum . . ., thus invoking the benefits and protections
of its laws" (id. at 475).
There is no true purposeful availment, nor foreseeability, where the
defendant simply knows that his or her actions will have an effect on a
particular industry reputed to exist in the forum state. In such a situation,
there has been no express direction of action at a particular entity and the
individual cannot be charged with anticipating that he or she has created a
sufficiently strong connection with the forum state that will support being
haled into court there. Unlike the situation in Calder and Panavision
where the defendant specifically targeted an individual party (the plaintiff)
and expressly aimed activities that would harm that individual, "general
industry effects" do not satisfy the traditional due process analysis.
No known case has upheld jurisdiction based upon the existence of
"general industry effects." In Cybersell v. Cybersell (9th Cir. 1997) 130
F.3d 414, the defendant surely was aware that its Internet conduct could
have an effect on any number of industries. However, as that Court noted
"[c]reating a site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may
be felt nationwide or even worldwide - but, without more, it is not an act
purposefully directed toward the forum state" (id. at 418, 420).
Additionally, it is well settled that in assessing specific jurisdiction, "the
plaintiff must present facts demonstrating that the conduct of the
defendant related to the pleaded causes is such as to constitute
constitutionally cognizable "minimum contacts'" (Edmunds v. Superior
Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 221, 228). A defendant's conduct generally
directed at an industry (as opposed to at a named party) cannot be said to
be a true "contact" related to the cause of action unless the industry as a
whole is suing. Simply conducting activities that touch upon the subject
matter of an industry reputed to exist in California does not rise to the
level of purposefully directing acts with an intention or expectation that a
California party will necessarily be affected (Goehring v. Superior Court
(1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 894, 909). Nor can such activity rise to the level of
deliberately availing oneself of the benefits and protections of the forum
state (Sibley v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 442, 447-448).
Holding that mere knowledge of an industry presence in a particular
forum provides jurisdiction for any dispute touching upon that industry's
subject matter would offend Due Process and lead to an obliteration of
traditional jurisdictional requirements. For these reasons and those to be
presented when this issue is fully briefed, This Court should review the
Appellate Court's decision and preclude the use of "general industry
effects" as a basis for jurisdiction in California.
Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court exercise its
discretion and grant review of these important legal issues, alternatively,
owing to the Court's active calendar, Petitioner would request that the
Court grant review and retransfer jurisdiction to the court of appeal for
reconsideration and for such other relief as the Court may deem
appropriate.
DATED: September 11, 2000 HUBER & SAMUELSON APC
By:
1 Compare the Internet jurisdiction cases of Panavision International L.P. v. Toeppen (9th Cir
1998) 141 F.3d 1316 and Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc. (9th Cir. 1997) 130 F.3d 414.
Although no known Supreme Court decision has so held, the distinctions between these cases
would appear to turn based on the ill-defined "express aiming" requirement.
2 Superior Court Case No. CV786804
3 References to the separately bound Appendix of Exhibits, filed concurrently with
petitioner's petition for writ of mandate in the Appellate Court will be denoted as "APP"; See
complaint included as exhibit A of the separately bound appendix of exhibits filed with the
Appellate Court.
4 A true and correct copy of Petitioner's Proof of Service, Notice of Motion, Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion, Declaration of Allonn E. Levy in support of Motion, and
Declaration of Matthew Pavlovich in Support of Motion to Quash Service of Process is included
as Exhibit B of the separately bound appendix of exhibits filed with the Appellate Court.
5 A true and correct copy of Real Party in Interest's opposing papers, which include Points and
Authorities in Opposition to Motion to Quash Service and the Declaration of Jonathan S.
Shapiro in Opposition to Motion to Quash Service, is included as Exhibit C of the separately
bound appendix of exhibits filed with the Appellate Court.
6 A true and correct copy of Petitioner's Reply Brief in Support of Motion, Reply declaration of
Allonn E. Levy in Support of Motion, and Objections to Evidence Submitted by Plaintiff is
included as Exhibit D of the separately bound appendix of exhibits filed with the Appellate
Court.
7 A true and correct copy of the court's order is included as Exhibit E of A true and correct
copy of Petitioner's Reply Brief in Support of Motion, Reply declaration of Allonn E. Levy in
Support of Motion, and Objections to Evidence Submitted by Plaintiff is included as Exhibit D
of the separately bound appendix of exhibits filed with the Appellate Court.
8 The parties have not disputed the fact that the computer code DeCSS is speech for
purposes of First Amendment analysis.
9 DVD CCA has provided no direct evidence that Mr. Johansen entered this agreement, or
that he violated such an agreement. Instead, DVD CCA simply avers that such agreements are
usually agreed to.
10 "APP" stands for the Appendix to Exhibits filed in the Appellate Court. For the
Court's convenience, all references to exhibits will include both the APP page number, followed
by the original document reference. For example APP pp.2-21; Complaint pp.1-20.
11 As indicated below, the evidence demonstrates that Petitioner did not actually own or
operate the LiVid web site that allegedly republished the DeCSS code. The LiVid web site that
allegedly contained DeCSS was voluntarily taken down (see APP.p.67; Declaration of
PAVLOVICH at 2:13-27).
12 The evidence shows he does not own or operate any such site, though PAVLOVICH
did have input into a web site operated by the LiVid group. See APP.p.67; Declaration of
PAVLOVICH at 2:17-27.
13 The open project which allegedly posted DeCSS was a loose association of people, whom
PAVLOVICH does not personally know (APP.p.170-171;exhibit A at pp.17-18), nor does he know
where those individuals are domiciled (APP.p.172;exhibit A at pp.19:19-21), nor who hosts the
LiVid list (APP.pp.173-174;exhibit A at 21-22). The goal of the LiVid group was to create better
support for video playback (APP.p.175;exhibit A at 23:10-15), not to harm any party in California.
14 (See Petitioner's Reply Papers attached as Exhibit D to the separately bound
Appendix of Exhibits, hereinafter Exhibit D at APP.pp174-175; Deposition of PAVLOVICH at
pp.22-23).
15 Real Party did provide two unauthenticated documents that it alleges are attributable to
Petitioner (see DVD CCA's opposition papers attached as Exhibit C to the separately bound
Appendix of Exhibits, hereinafter Exhibit C, at APP.p.111-114; Declaration of Shapiro at
exhibit C). Petitioner filed objections to this evidence pursuant to Evidence code §§350, 412,
702, 800 and 1520-1523, (See Exhibit D at APP.pp.157-158; Objections to Evidence at pp.1-2).
Without waiving said objections, Petitioner contends that far from showing any intentional act,
the e-mails show Petitioner's disagreement with DVD CCA's contentions (Exhibit C at
APP.p.114; Declaration of Shapiro at exhibit C). The documents also show that at some point
prior to the surfacing of DeCSS on the web (on October 25, 1999 according to DVD CCA; see
Exhibit A at APP.p.14; Complaint at 13:17-22), Petitioner quoted someone else's incorrect
hearsay statement that Reverse engineering is illegal in most places (Exhibit C, at APP.p.112;
Declaration of Shapiro at exhibit C). Additionally, the October 1, 1999 e-mail regarding reverse
engineering clearly states it relates to software drivers and not to any part of CSS or DeCSS.
16 In yet another example, the Court in Goehring v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 894,
909 noted the confusion involved in the "express aiming" requirement and the Calder test
generally. That Court handled the ambiguities by analyzing the level of intent on the part of the
non-resident defendant in "expressly aiming" contact with the resident plaintiff, but did not
clarify the boundaries of Calder.
17 Also citing Wolf v. City of Alexandria (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 541; Kulko v. Superior Court
(1978) 436 U.S. 84, 94-95.
18 Compare the Internet jurisdiction cases of Panavision International L.P. v. Toeppen (9th Cir
1998) 141 F.3d 1316 and Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc. (9th Cir. 1997) 130 F.3d 414.
Although no known Supreme Court decision has so held, the distinctions between these cases
would appear to turn based on the ill-defined "express aiming" requirement.
19 Should the Court grants review as requested, petitioner will provide full briefing and case
citations on this issue.
20 It is well settled that "random, fortuitous or attendant contacts" will not support personal
jurisdiction (Burger King v. Rudzewicz, (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 475-476, 485).
[end]
Burger King v. Rudzewicz, (1985), 471 U.S. 462 ......
Calder v. Jones, (1984) 465 U.S. 783 ......
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.
(9th Cir. 1997), 130 F.3d 414 ......
Kulko v. Superior Court (1978), 436 U.S. 84 ......
Panavision International L.P. v. Toeppen (9th Cir 1998), 141 F.3d 1316 ......
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980), 444 U.S. 286 ......STATE CASES
Goehring v. Superior Court (1998), 62 Cal. App. 4th 894 ......
Sibley v. Superior Court (1976), 16 Cal. 3d 442 ......
Wolf v. City of Alexandria (1990), 217 Cal. App. 3d 541 ......STATUTES
Cal. Code of Civil Procedure §418.10......
Cal. Evidence Code §350......
Cal. Evidence Code §412......
Cal. Evidence Code §702......
Cal. Evidence Code §800 ......
Cal. Evidence Code §§1520-1523......
Cal. Rule of Court 28 ......
Cal. Rule of Court 29 ......
I.
PETITION FOR REVIEW
II.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A. SUMMARY OF REASONS FOR REVIEW
III.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. PROCEDURAL FACTS
B. JURISDICTIONAL FACTS
1. Situs and Identification of Parties
2. Factual Summary
IV.
ARGUMENT
A. COMPELLING REASONS EXIST FOR THIS COURT TO
GRANT THE PETITION FOR REVIEW
B.
THE EXPRESS AIMING REQUIREMENT IN CALDER
OUGHT TO PROPERLY BE READ AS REQUIRING AN
INTENTIONAL DIRECTION OF CONSEQUENCES AIMED
AT A KNOWN PARTY IN THE FORUM STATE
C. CALIFORNIA OUGHT NOT EXERCISE JURISDICTION
BASED SOLELY UPON THE EXISTENCE OF ALLEGED
EFFECTS FELT BY INDUSTRIES REPUTED TO EXIST IN
CALIFORNIA
V.
CONCLUSION
ALLONN E. LEVY
Attorneys for Defendant
MATTHEW PAVLOVICH
ENDNOTES
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