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bÔ 4 L d | (á 0Ş <▄ D˘ M Y0 aH i` qx@ Ř v  mD22  f  d  t                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 t                   WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS d  x         t SEPI9  ~  20P ~ I 91
 d  t                        AUSTIN DIVISION
 mF$$
1
;  d  x                                      t  x               t  t _ y x           t . i C -

 d  t STEVE JACKSON GAMES INCORPORATED x      t ) x            t  x                t  ?  ~ E ~  w I w lTY
 Š  m  l STEVE JACKSON, ELIZABETH
 ý  mD22  f  t McCOY, WALTER MILLIKEN, and
 t STEFFAN O'SULLIVAN,

 m>$$  t             Plaintiffs, x               t ) Docket No. A 91 CA 346

 Š  m  p  d v.
 ­ 
 m  p  d UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
WILLIAM J. COOK, TIMOTHY M. FOLEY,
BARBARA GOLDEN, and HENRY M.
KLUEPFEL,
 ­ 
 m  p Defendants.
 ­ 
 l PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE AND
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
 u INDIVIDUAL §   u DEFENDANTS' §   u MOTION §   u TO §   u DISMISS § 

 b INTRODUCTION

 Ô Plaintiffs ?  w l submit this response and memorandum of law

in 4Ř opposition to the individual defendants' d  ?  w 2  d motion to

dismiss the claims against them for lack of personal

jurisdiction. The plaintiffs allege that the individual

defendants, acting as federal officials under color of

 ý  m  p  ?  w 1 Plaintiffs are Steve Jackson Games (SJG), an award-
winning publisher of books, magazines and games in Austin,
Texas; its owner and Austin resident Steve Jackson; and three
user ~  of an electronic bulletin board system operated in
Austin by SJG.
 ­ 
 m  p  d 2  d The individual defendants, all of whom acted as
federal officers under color of federal law, are William J.
Cook, an Assistant United States Attorney; Secret Service
Agents Timothy M. Foley and Barbara Golden; and Henry M.
Kluepfel.
 ­  z ;┐■yěsîĂ;~■0┌1°1äćŃ|Ĺ>1°1çćŃ|X ! v  m  p  d federal law, planned and executed a search of Steve Jackson
Games in Austin, Texas, and the seizure of property,
publications, and private communications therefrom, in
violation of plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fourth
Amendments and the Electronic Communication Privacy Act, 18
U.S.C. ĄĄ 2510 et seq & 2701 et seq.3 Defendants cannot
seriously dispute that their contacts with this forum giving
rise to this lawsuit -- which include investigating Austin
residents, preparing and filing a search warrant application
 u with §   u this §   u Court § , and planning and executing the search and
seizure at SJG in Austin -- were substantial and deliberate.
Rather, they claim that personal jurisdiction over them is
lacking because they acted within the scope of their
employment. Defendants' arguments, which they base on the
fiduciary shield doctrine and the Supremacy Clause, are
incorrect and should be denied.
 ­ 
 m  p I. DEFENDANTS'  ~ UBSTANTIAL AND DELIBERATE
CONTACTS WITH THIS FORVM JU L!STIFY THE
EXERCIBE OF PERBONAL JURI ~ DICTION OVER THEM.
 ­ 
 m  p Jurisdiction over nonresident defendants is permissible
 ­ 
 l in a federal question case if defendants are amenable to

service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) and if the

 ý  m  p exercise of jurisdiction over them comports with Due Process.
 ­ 
 m  p  d 3  d Plaintiffs have also asserted claims against the
government, including a claim that defendants' conduct
violated the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. Ą
2000aa  u et §   u seq § .
 ­  z 8ˇ0ˇ0ÖÓÓp ń v  m  l  d -3 -

Omni Capital Intern. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co. Ltd., 484 U.S. 97

(1987). Since Rule 4(e) incorporates the long arm statute of

the forum state, and since the Texas  b long arm  Ô statute, which

has been interpreted to reach the limits of Due Process,

jurisdiction over the defendants is appropriate if it is

constitutionally permissible.  u Stuart §   u v. §   u Spademan § , 722 F.2d

1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1985) ( u citing §   u Hall §   u v. §   u Helicopteros § 

 u Nacionales §   u de §   u Colombia § , 638 S.W. 2d 870, 872 (Tex.1982),

 ý  m  p  u rev'd §   u on §   u other §   u grounds § , 466 U.S. 408 (1984)).
 ­ 
 m  p The Due Process clause permits the exercise of specific
 ­ 
 l jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants if they have

"'purposefully directed' [their] activities at residents of

the forum, ... and the litigation results from the alleged

 ý  m  p injuries that 'arise out of or relate to' those activities."
 ­ 
 l  u Buraer §   u King §   u Corp. §   u v dń. §   u Rudzewic § , 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)

( u quoting §   u Hanson §   u v. §   u Denckla § , 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).4

Defendants who engage in "intentional, and allegedly

tortious, actions .. . expressly aimed at" the forum thereby

subject themselves to its jurisdiction.  u Calder §   u v. §   u Jones § , 465

 ý  m  p  ~  In contrast to "general jurisdiction," which
requires continuous and systematic contacts with the forum
state, specific jurisdiction "may arise without the
nonresident defendant's ever stepping foot upon the forum
state's soil or may arise incident to the commission of a
single act directed at the forum".  u Bullion §   u v. §   u Gillespie § , 895
F.2d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 1990). "Specific jurisdiction is
proper even if a defendant has only minimal contact with the
forum State, provided a nexus exists between the defendant's
contacts, the forum, and the litigation."  u Stuart §   u v. §   u Spademan § ,
772 F.2d 1185, 1189-90 (4th Cir. 1985).
 ­  z  ł Q v  m  l  d -4 -

U.S. 783, 789-790 (1984);  u Asahi §   u Metal §   u Ind. §   u v. §   u Superior §   u Court § 

 u of §   u California § , 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). The exercise of

specific jurisdiction is proper if "the defendant ~ s'] conduct

and connection with the forum State are such that [they ~ 

 ý  m  p should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."
 ­ 
 l  u World-Wide §   u Volkswagen §   u Corp. §   u v. §   u Woodson § , 444 U.S. 286, 297

 ý  m  p ( 19 8 0 ) .
 ­ 
 m  p Defendants' claim that their contacts with this forum
 ­ 
 l are insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court is

without merit. ?  w S Defendants invoked the jurisdiction of this

Court when they submitted a warrant application to  u this §   u Court § 

seekinq authorization to conduct a series of three searches

and seizures, including the search and seizure at SJG, in

Austin. d 6

 ý  m  p  d 5 To defeat defendants' motion to dismiss, plaintiffs
need only demonstrate a  u pri$ö |Qma §   u facie §  case of personal
jurisdiction. Moreover, all uncontroverted allegations in
the complaint must be taken as true, and any conflicts
between the parties' affidavits must be resolved in
plaintiffs' favor.  u Bullion §   u v. §   u Gillespie § , 895 F.2d 213, 217
(5th Cir. 1990).
 ­ 
 m  p  d 6  d The warrant application and supporting affidavit
seeking this Court's authorization to search the Austin
office of SJG and the Austin residences of Loyd Blankenship
and Chris Goggans is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit A.
The warrant affidavit, which was drafted by defendants Cook
and Foley, and was submitted to this Court by defendant
Foley, asserts that it is based on Foley's own investigation,
as well as on information and investigation provided by
Defendants Golden and Kluepfel. Declarations of Timothy M.
Foley and William Cook, Attached as Exhibits A ~ B to United
States Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary
Judgment. Defendants' inventory of items seized was
submitted to thi  łQs Court by defendant Golden and is attached
to the Complaint as Exhibit B.
 ­  z ÇÇÇÇÇÇÇÇÇÇÇ0Ç`0xxŘÇ└x˝└´,Č ¨ v  m  l  d -5-

 ý  m  p Defendants were the "primary participants" in the
 ­ 
 m  p unlawful search and seizure at SJG in Austin.  u Calder §   u v. § 
 ­ 
 l  u Jones § , 465 U.S. at 789-90. All of the defendants

participated in this Austin-focussed investigation,' and all

have admitted having substantial contact with this forum for

the purpose of executing the search of SJG and the seizure

and retention of materials therefrom. Defendants Foley,

Golden, and Kluepfel have even admitted that they were

physically present during the execution of the search warrant

at SJG. ~  Their contacts with this forum in the course of

planning and executing the search and seizure were

purposefully directed at residents of this forum, where the

impact of their activities would obviously be felt. Id.;

 ý  m  p  d 7  d The warrant affidavit drafted by Cook and Foley
states that it is based on Foley's investigation, on
"information" provided by defendant Golden, and on "technical
information and i (á¨nvestigative assistance" from defendant
Kluepfel. Warrant Affidavit at paras. 2  ~  3. The warrant
affidavit reveals that, as part of his investigation of
Austin residents, defendant Kluepfel accessed at least two
electronic bulletin board services connected to Austin
telephone numbers run from computers systems in Austin,
including the electronic bulletin board run by SJG. Warrant
Affidavit at paras. 24, 35.
 ­ 
 m  p  ~  Declarations of Timothy M. Foley, Henry M. Kluepfel,
and Barbara Golden, Attached as Exhibits A, C, and D to
Motion to Dismiss of Individual Defendants. Defendant Foley
further admits to meeting with Steve Jackson in the Austin
Field Office of the Secret Service the day after the search
and seizure, at which time the Secret Service refused to
return any of the seized equipment and most of the seized
data to Jackson. Declaration of Timothy M. Foley, Attached
as Exhibit B to United States Motion to Dismiss or in the
Alternative for Summary Judgment; Complaint at paras. 53-55.
 ­  z 4─ 	▀ v  m  l  d  u Asahi §   u Metal §   u Ind. §   u v. §   u Superior §   u Court §   u of §   u California § , 480 U.S. at

112;  u Burger §   u King §   u Corp. §   u v. §   u Rudzewic § , 471 U.S. 462, 472

( 19 8 5 ) .  d 9

 d Moreover, in planning and executing the search and

seizure at SJG, the defendants utilized the resources of this

Court, of the University of Texas, and of local law

enforcement officers, thereby availing themselves of the

 ý  m  p privileges and protections of this Texas forum. ?  w lí  u Hanson §   u v. § 
 ­ 
 m  p  d 9  d Defendant Cook's assertion that he was not present
in Texas during the events giving rise to this lawsuit does
not undermine this Court's jurisdiction over him. Cook
oversaw the investigation, drafted the warrant affidavit,
negotiated the return of the property by telephone with Mr.
Jackson, who was in Texas, and caused a subpoena to be served
on the University of Texas. Complaint at paras. 20, 56;
Warrant Affidavit at para.37; Declaration o8đ 0Ş▀f William J. Cook,
Attached as Exhibit A in support of the United States Motion
to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment.
 ­  m  x 
 p Where as here, a defendant's conduct giving rise to a
lawsuit was "'purposefully directed' towards residents of
another State," the Supreme Court has "consistently rejected
the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat
personal jurisdiction there."  u Burger §   u King § , 471 U.S. at 476
(citing cases);  u Calder §   u v. §   u Jones § , 465 U.S. at 789 (affirming
jurisdiction over Florida-based defendants in California
"based on the 'effects' of their Florida conduct in
California");  u Prejean §   u v. §   u Sonatrach, §   u Inc § . 652 F.2d 1260 (5th
Cir. 1981). Indeed, in this age of electronic
communications, it is easier than ever to direct events in a
jurisdiction without ever setting foot within its geographic
boundaries.
 ­ 
 m  p  ?  w 1 w 0 The warrant affidavit states that defendant Foley
obtained investigative assistance from Larry 4─▀ Coutourie, "an
inspector with campus security at the University of Texas in
Austin, Texas," who allegedly provided Foley with Texas
drivers license information concerning the Austin residents
Loyd Blankenship and Chris Goggans from his review of
"locator information at the University of Texas." Warrant
Affidavit at paras. 33 & 36. Pursuant to a grand jury
subpoena which defendant Cook caused to be issued on the
University of Texas, defendant Foley received additional
 ­  z Ç╔▀┐?8y¨├¸š└?Çy¤ ˇ˝¸ÇÇř▀┐┐~řřš¸š└┐Çx´ űˇˇÇ└╠Ă7Ö7═ČŠ█$└┘Ç<Ř═śă3└└NĂ&×#˝$░├ăÇŮ<Ř˝°Ă└ÇOĂ#|!­├├└Ů|˘Đ­ĂÓ└MĂ#╠!°├,└ś~▄═Ş├7Ń└═¤;7ء╣š´└╝š¤ ▀ˇ■ˇ@Ŕ  v  m  l  d -7 -

 ý  m  p  u Denckla § , 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958);  u Growden §   u v. §   u Ed §   u Bowlin §   u and § 
Associates. Inc., 733 F.2d 1149, 1151 (Sth Cir. 1984).
 ­  m  x 
 p There is no question that the defendants expected to
return to this Court in connection with their Austin
investigation.  u World-Wide §   u Volkswagen §   u Corp. §   u v. §   u Woodson § , 444
U.S. 286, 297 (1980). The fact that they undoubtedly
intended to prosecute the targets of their investigation,
rather than defend their unlawful search and seizure in this
lawsuit, does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction over
them.
 ­ 
 l II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
 ý  m  x 
 p IS NOT PROHIBITED BY THE "FIDUCIARY  ~ HIELD DOCTRINE."
 ­ 
 m  p Defendants' argument that they are shielded from suit in
 ­ 
 l this  ~ urisdiction based on contacts undertaken in the scope

 ý  m  p of their employment fails for two reasons.
 ­ 
 m  p First, the argument was expressly rejected b <▄y the United
 ­ 
 m  p States Supreme Court in  u Calder §   u v. §   u Jones § , 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
 ­ 
 l In  u Calder § , actress Shirley Jones filed suit for damages in

California against the Florida-based writer and editor of an

allegedly libelous article about her that was published in

the  u National §   u Enquirer § . The writer and editor moved to

dismiss for lack of personal  ~ urisdiction, arguing that they

 ý  m  p information about Austin resident and University of Texas
student Chris Goggans from Margaret Knox, Assistant Director
of the Computation Center at the University of Texas.  u Id §  at
para. 37. Moreover, defendants enlisted the assistance of
local law enforcement officers in executing the searches and
seizures in Austin. Complaint at para. 42.
 ­  z └Řř▀│ˇš¨ű ´ Ă?v~╗¸ow└;ť└ŘŘ▀űˇšxŃ ¤ýf&╗¸Ç3ł└I  v  m  p  d acted within the scope of their employment and had no direct
economic stake in their employer's sales in a distant State.
465 at 789. The Supreme Court rejected their argument,
reasoning that defendants' "status as employees does not
somehow insulate them from jurisdiction." 465 U.S. at 790.
The Court held that jurisdiction was proper because
defendants were "primary participants in an alleged
wrongdoing intentionally directed at a California resident."
465 U.S. at 790. The Court emphasized that defendants
"expressly aimed" their Florida conduct at California and
knew that the "impact" of their actions would be felt in
California. 465 U.S. at 789-790.
 ­  m  x 
 p Here, as in  u Calder § , defendants' conduct giving rise to
this lawsuit was deliberately aimed at residents of this
forum. Defendants knew that the impact of the search and
seizure they planned and executed would be felt here. The
basis for personal jurisdiction in this case is even stronger
than in  u Calder §  because, whi D˘le the activity giving rise to the
lawsuit in  u Calder §  did not occur in the forum of the lawsuit,
defendants in this case had substantial contact with this
forum in planning and executing the search and seizure and
delibera ~ ely invoked the jurisdiction of this Court.
 ­  m  x 
 p Defendant's reliance on  u Stuart §   u v. §   u Spademan § , 772 F.2d at
1189, is misplaced, for in that case the Fifth Circuit
similarly based its personal jurisdiction ruling on the
defendant's contacts with the forum undertaken in the scope
 ­  z └└└└└└└Q ? v  m  l  d of his employment. 772 F.2d at 1192-1194. The Court

interpreted the fiduciary shield doctrine narrowly to hold

only that personal  ~ urisdiction over the defendant cannot be

based on contacts established by  u other §  employees of the

 ý  m  p corporation. 772 F.2d at 1197 & n.ll.
 ­ 
 l  u Saktides §   u v. §   u Cooper § , 742 F. Supp. 382 (W.D. Tex. 1990),

on which defendants also rely, is clearly distinguishable by

its facts. In contrast to the defendants in this case --

federal officials whose conduct giving rise to this lawsuit

was deliberately directed at this forum -- the defendant in

 u Saktides §  had no contact with Texas in relation to the

litigation other than handling the funds of a Texas

corporation. Therefore, the court correctly ruled that the

Due Process Clause prohibited the exercise of personal

jurisdiction over him. The court's discussion of the

fiduciary shield doctrine was unnecessary  u dicta §  which should

not be extended to this  ? case. w l w U$ M?l

 ý  m  p  ?  w l w l Application of the  u dicta §  in the  u Saktides §  opinion to
the facts of  u this §  case would conflict with the Supreme
Court's decision in  u Calder §   u v. §   u Jones § , 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
This  u dicta §  also conflicts with decisions of Courts of Appeals
holding that the fiduciary shield doctrine is "not a
constitutional principle, but is rather a doctrine based on
judicial inference as to the intended scope of the long arm
statute," and is therefore inapplicable where, as in Texas,
the forum state's long-arm statute is co-extensive with the
full reach of the Due Process clause.  u Pittsburg §   u Terminal § 
Corp v. Mid Allegheny Corp., 831 F.2d 522, 525 (4th Cir.
1987);  u Columbia §   u Briargate §   u Co. §   u v. §   u First §   u National §   u Bank § , 713
F.2d 1052 (4th Cir. 1983)  u cert. §   u denied §   u sub §   u nom, §   u Pearson §   u v. § 
 u Columbia §   u Briargate §   u Co. § , 465 U.S. 1007 (1984);  u Marine §   u Midland § 
 u Bank. §   u N.A. §   Q? u v. §   u Miller § , 664 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1981).
 ­  z x i`ëV]< Ó v  m  l  d -10-

 ý  m  p  d Second, the fiduciary shield doctrine, as interpreted by
 ­ 
 l defendants, does not apply to federal officials who are sued

for their activities under color of federal law. d 12  d The

Supreme Court has made clear that the conduct of federal

officials committing constitutional torts under color of

federal authority is attributed to them in their  u personal § 

capacities.  u Bivens §   u v. §   u Six §   u Unknown §   u Named §   u Agents §   u of §   u the § 

 ý  m  p  u Federal §   u Bureau §   u of §   u Narcotics § , 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
 ­ 
 l Defendants' argument, if it were accepted, would eliminate

specific jurisdiction over out-of-state federal officials for

constitutional torts committed against residents of the

forum, thereby thwarting "plaintiff[s'] interest in obtaining

relief," the States' interest in protecting their citizens

from unconstitutional exercises of federal power, "the

interstate judicial systems's interest in obtaining effi Y0Ócient

resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the

several States in furthering fundamental substantive social

 ý  m  p  d 12  d The complaint alleges, and its uncontroverted facts
demonstrate, that all of the defendants, including defendant
Kluepfel, acted as federal officials under color of federal
law. Complaint at paras 20, 22-23, 84, 92, 99, 109, 199.
Kluepfel's status as a federal official is amply demonstrated
not only by his investigative activities giving rise to this
lawsuit as recounted in the Warrant Affidavit at paras. 3b,
24-28, 31-32, and 35, but also by the fact that he is
represented before this Court by the Justice Department.
 u See § ,  u e.g. § ,  u Schowengerdt §   u v. §   u General §   u Dynamics §   u Corp § , 823, F.2d
1328 (9th Cir. 1987) (security investigator for private
company who participated with federal defendants in search
was federal actor acting under color of federal law for
purposes of  u Bivens §  liability).
 ­  z b&ŹÖ│˛ŠmÖÇ╠╣â¨Ăv╠cŞeT ć v  m  p  d policies."  u World §   u Wide §   u Volkswagen §   u Corp. §   u v. §   u Woodson § , 444 U.S.
286, 292 (1980). It is therefore not surprising that
defendants have not cited a single case to support their
assertion that federal courts lack jurisdiction over federal
officials for constitutional torts committed under color of
federal law within their districts. Defendants' Memorandum
at 4 n.2.
 ­ 
 l III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE INDIVIDUAL
DEFENDANTS I8 NOT PROHIBITED BY THE  ~ UPREMACY CLAUSE

 ý  m  p Defendants' claim that this  u federal §  Court's exercise of
 ­ 
 l jurisdiction over them would be an unconstitutional exercise

of  u state §  power  d i8  d frivolous. No supremacy issue is raised

where, as here, federal officials acting under color of

federal law are sued under federal causes of action in

federal court. The defendants' claim that the State of Texas

has unconstitutionally conditioned their activities within

its borders on being subject to suit in Texas m aHćisses the

mark, because in a federal question case, personal

jurisdiction over the defendant is determined by federal, not

state, law. d 13

 ý  m  p 13  d In a federal question case where there is no
statutory provision for service of process, the state long
arm provision is incorporated by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(e).  u Omni §   u Capital §   u Intern. §   u v. §   u Rudolf §   u Wolff §   u  ~  §   u Co. § 
Ltd., 484 U.S. 97 (1987). Defendants' argument is
particularly odd in light of their recognition that the Texas
long arm statute has been interpreted to be co-extensive with
the federal Due Process standard.
 ­  z ml } v  m  l  d -12-

 ý  m  p The Supremacy Clause cases cited by the defendants are
 ­ 
 l inapposite because they all involve attempts to sue or

prosecute federal officials or agencies in state court under

state law. d 14  d The remaining cases cited by defendant are all

cases interpreting the long arm statutes of jurisdictions

other than Texas and do not support defendants' claim that a

federal court lacks personal jurisdiction over out-of-state

government officials engaged in unlawful searches and

seizures within its  ? district. w l w s

 ý  m  p  d 14  d    u M'Culloch §   u v. §   u Maryland § , 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 432
(1819) (Bank of the United States immune from state
taxation);  u In §   u re §   u  ~ eagle § , 135 U.S. 1 (1890) (federal official
immune from state prosecution);  u Martin §   u Malhoyt § , 830 F.2d 237
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (federal officers immune from state law tort
actions);  u California §   u v. §   u Walters § , 751 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1984)
(sovereign immun i`}ity bars state prosecution of Veterans'
Administration and its Administrator).
 ­ 
 m  p  ?  w 1 w 5    u Glaros §   u v. §   u Perse § , 628 F.2d 679, 681-82 (lst Cir.
1980) (jurisdiction was lacking over out-of-state defendants
because plaintiff had failed to allege that defendants
engaged in conduct covered by the state's long arm statute);
 u Green §   u v. §   u McCall § , 710 F.2d 29, 32-34 (2d Cir. 1983) (personal
jurisdiction over defendant could not be based on a state
long arm provision conferring jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant who commits a tortious act within the forum
state through an agent because the agent was an agent of the
government rather than of the defendant);  u Grove §   u Press. §   u Inc. § 
 u v. §   u Angleton § , 649 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1981) (same);  u Marsh §   u v. § 
 u Kitchen § , 480 F.2d 1270, 1272-73 (2d Cir. 1973) (same).
 ­  z  b v  m  l  d -13-

CONCLUSION
 ý  m  x 
 p For the reasons stated above, the individual defendants'
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction should be
denied.
 ­ 
 m  p Respectfully submitted
by their attorneys,
 ­ 
 l  d J ?  w h ~ v ~   ~ c ~ 
 d Sharon L. Beckman (BBO #552077)
Andrew Good (BBO #201240)
Harvey Silverglate (BBO #462640)
Silverglate & Good
89 Broad St., 14th Floor
Boston, MA 02110
(617) 542-6663

 ý  m  p 6(  ~ 
ric M. Lieberman
Nicholas E. Poser
Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky
& Lieberman, P.C.
740 Broadway, at Astor Place
New York, NY 10003-9518
(212) 254-1111
 ­ 
 l  d  ~  ?  w b1  ?  w b1  ~ 

 d R. James George, Jr. ( ~ 07800011)
Peter D. Kennedy (#112 ~ 650)
Graves, Dougherty,  ~ earon & Moody
2300 NCNB Tower
515 Congress Avenue
Austin, TX 78701
(512) 480-5600

DATED: September 18, 1991
 ý  z 0└`0`0>80Ç┴ŃÓ