Newsgroups: alt.comp.acad-freedom.talk
From: greeny@top.cis.syr.edu (J. S. Greenfield)
Subject:  Re: How to annoy Rush!
Message-ID: <1993Apr1.014728.10395@newstand.syr.edu>
Date: Thu, 1 Apr 93 01:47:27 EST

In article <C4rq10.5sF@news.cso.uiuc.edu> resnick@cogsci.uiuc.edu (Pete Resnick) writes:
>
>>I believe that some "privileges" are subject to due process
>>requirements because I believe that is what the Supreme Court said in
>>_Goss v. Lopez_ (see refs).
>
>At least according to the references you cite below which I downloaded,
>no such thing is said. Goss v. Lopez said that the state could not
>suspend children from school without due process *specifically because
>education was guaranteed by state law*. Is there something in the
>original text of the decision that sheds more light on this? As far as
>I can tell, privileges are not subject to due process requirements
>according to this case.

Well, I have now had a chance to read the files in the archive, and to look
up the case.

I think you have misinterpreted what you read (though, there isn't a whole
lot there).

The majority opinion states:

"At the outset, appellants contend that because there is no constitutional right
to an education at public expense, the Due Process Clause does not protect
against expulsions from the public school system.  This position misconceives
the nature of the issue and is refuted by prior decisions.  The Fourteenth
Amendment forbids the State to deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.  Protected interests in property are
normally 'not created by the Constitution.  Rather, they are created and
their dimensions are defined' by an independent source such as state statutes
or rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits."

and

"Here, on the basis of state law, appellees plainly had legitimate claims of
entitlement to a public education."


In other words, a state law *happened* to be what established the property
interest in this case.  It is clear from the holding, however, that
many other things (for example, a state university's rules and regulations)
could also establish property interests.


The majority opinion continues [I'm going to use "$" as the section symbol]:

"Ohio Rev. Code Ann. $$ 3313.48 and 3313.64 (1972 and Supp. 1973) direct
local authorities to provide a free education to all residents between five
and 21 years of age, and a compulsory-attendance law requires attendance for
a school year of not less than 32 weeks.  It is true that $ 3313.66 of the
Code permits school principals to suspend students for up to 10 days; but
suspensions may not be imposed without any grounds whatsoever.  All of the
schools had their own rules specifying the grounds for expulsion or suspension.
Having chosen to extend the right to an education to people of appellees'
class generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on the grounds of
misconduct absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the
misconduct has occurred."


In other words, when a property interest is created, the state can *not*
also create a loophole by which it can arbitrarily revoke that interest.
(The court doesn't speak in terms of "rights" versus "privileges" here.
They speak only of property "interests."  It is clear to me however, that
the meaning of this is to say, in essence, that the state can't simply
declare a property interest to be a "privilege," and then use that
declaration to revoke the "privilege" without due process.)


My conclusion is that Goss v. Lopez is definitely applicable to computer
access issues (at a public institution).  Clearly, making computer
accounts available to students (via university policies, rules, etc.)
establishes a property interest on the part of the student.  According to
Goss, even if the university had a regulation stating that sysadmins have
absolute power to immediately revoke access in response to (alleged)
misconduct, that regulation would be invalid, and a student would still
have due process rights.



As for the question as to what constitutes a "modicum" of due process,
I can't say for sure.  The court did state, however (and recall that
this is all in reference to short-term suspensions):

"Students facing temporary suspension have interests qualifying for protection
of the Due Process Clause, and due process requires, in connection with a
suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written
notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of
the evidence that authorities have and an opportunity tp present his side
of the story.  The Clause requires at least these rudimentary precautions
against unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion
from school."


For the case at hand (which as I stated in an earlier post, I presume does not
qualify as either an emergency or a trivial sanction--I'm also assuming that
we're talking about a public school, though I don't recall), I take this to
mean that the school cannot suspend the accused student's access without
*first* having a hearing, if the student denies the allegations against him.

(If the student does not deny the allegations, then presumably, no hearing
is required.)


-- 
J. S. Greenfield                                         greeny@top.cis.syr.edu
(I like to put 'greeny' here, 
but my d*mn system wants a 
*real* name!)                        "What's the difference between an orange?"


-------------------------------------------

Newsgroups: alt.comp.acad-freedom.talk
From: greeny@top.cis.syr.edu (J. S. Greenfield)
Subject:  Re: How to annoy Rush!
Message-ID: <1993Apr1.142431.452@newstand.syr.edu>
Date: Thu, 1 Apr 93 14:24:31 EST

In article <C4spFu.7wK@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu> lemson@uiuc.edu writes:
>
>>It is a matter under debate whether the suspension of an account counts
>>as student discipline, and it is CERTAINLY suspect to mention it
>>in the same breath as suspension from school.
>
>No doubt.  Suspending a student's free e-mail account is FAR from
>suspending them from classes.  I doubt anyone would agree with that,
>and yet Carl continues to base his entire argument on the fact that
>a student should not be suspended from classes without such and
>such.
>I repeat.. if it was a class account, required to complete homework
>in a certain class, I would object to such suspension.  Assuming it
>has the relative status of a uxa/ux4 account, I would say that such
>suspension probably is OK. (But, of course, who among us knows 100%
>of the details...)
>
>(my opinions, not CCSO's...)

Your opinions are apparently based upon some false assumptions.  First of
all, for many of us, there is no clear distinction between a "class account"
and other accounts.

I have never used a "class account" to do any work.  (Years ago, I once had
a "class account" automatically assigned to me, though I didn't need it,
and didn't use it.  Otherwise, I have not had "class accounts.")

I use my "regular" accounts to do all of my work, as well as handle email,
read news, etc.  Cutting off my access to a "regular" account would be
as serious an infringement to me as suspension from a class would be to others.
(Actually, I don't take classes anymore.)


More importantly, you have a basic misunderstanding of the law regarding
such matters.  You seem to think that, if the interest infringed is
relatively "small," then not as much protection is due, as compared to
when the interest infringed is relative "large."  (i.e., you think that
suspendion of non-class accounts is not comparable to suspension from
classes.)

In fact, the only way that this could be the case would be if the interest
infringed were *trivial* in the first place.  In Goss v. Lopez, the school
tried to use a similar argument.  The court's response was:

"The Court's view has been that as long as a property deprivation is not
de minimus, its gravity is irrelevant to the question whether account must
be taken of the Due Process Clause."


I do not believe that, in general, access to computing facilities is a trivial
interest.  As such, your argument that suspension of a computer account is
less severe than suspension from a class is totally irrelevant.

Clearly, there is justification for Carl's analogy to suspension from a
class.


-- 
J. S. Greenfield                                         greeny@top.cis.syr.edu
(I like to put 'greeny' here, 
but my d*mn system wants a 
*real* name!)                        "What's the difference between an orange?"

